Noise Trading and the Management of Operational Risk; Firms,Traders and Irrationality in Financial Markets*

abstract Efficient market models cannot explain the high level of trading in financial markets in terms of asset portfolio adjustment. It is presumed that much of this excessive trading is irrational ‘noise’ trading. A corollary is that there must either be irrational traders in the market or rational traders with irrational aberrations. The paper reviews the various attempts to explain noise trading in the finance literature, concluding that the persistence of irrationality is not well explained. Data from a study of 118 traders in four large investment banks are presented to advance reasons why traders might seek to trade more frequently than financial models predict. The argument is advanced that trades do not simply occur in order to generate profit, but it does not follow that such trading is irrational. Trading may generate information, accelerate learning, create commitments and enhance social capital, all of which sustain traders' long term survival in the market. The paper treats noise trading as a form of operational risk facing firms operating in financial markets and discusses approaches to the management of such risk.     

Vacaciones y licencias en países desarrollados: los Estados Unidos a la zaga en cuanto a equilibrio entre vida profesional y vida familiar

Los autores comparan las normativas sobre vacaciones y licencias susceptibles de facilitar el equilibrio entre vida profesional y familiar de Australia, Canadá, República de Corea, Estados Unidos, Europa occidental y Japón utilizando un índice compuesto para clasificarlas. Los Estados Unidos figuran en último lugar: la concesión de vacaciones anuales al trabajador no es obligatoria y las licencias por motivos familiares se limitan a 12 semanas al año. Este bajo nivel de reglamentación podría deberse, según los autores, a una concepción mercantilista del empleo sumada a la creencia de que empleador y trabajadores tienen idéntica capacidad de negociación, visión no compartida por las demás democracias industrializadas.     

Real Asset Valuation under Imperfect Competition: Can We Forget About Market Fundamentals?

Real assets are usually valued by computing the stream of profits they can bring to a price‐taking firm in a liquid market. This method ignores market fundamentals by assuming that all the relevant information is included in the spot price. Our article analyses the bias resulting from such an approach when the market is imperfectly competitive. We propose a stylised two‐period model of the natural gas market with no uncertainty, focusing on strategic interactions between two types of oligopolistic players—pure traders and suppliers with downstream customers—who have access to storage. We show that the true value of storage capacity is not the same for traders and for suppliers. Comparing the latter value with the traditional price‐taking valuation reveals a systematic bias that tends to induce underinvestment.     

Liberty and the Post‐utilitarian Society

Utilitarian foundations for limited government are shaky insofar as they assume rational and consistent individuals. Recently economists’ assumption of rational actors has come under sustained attack. Behavioural economics has suggested that people are plagued by irrational biases and inconsistencies. These developments have led to a post‐utilitarianism which is held to justify paternalistic interventions by the state via ‘sin taxes’, direct bans or new obligations. Individual responsibility is seriously undermined, as is faith in markets. Supporters of individual freedom need to move away from utilitarian reasoning, reassert core values of autonomy and responsibility, and define strict limits on the scope of government intervention.     

Do Institutionalized Traditions Matter During Crisis? Employee Downsizing in Korean Manufacturing Organizations

This study examines the downfall of the permanent employment tradition in South Korean manufacturing organizations in the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian economic crisis. We explore whether organizations abandon their traditional institutionalized practices under discontinuous environmental change or despite the change continue these time‐honoured practices. We examine both the organizational factors that inhibit lay‐offs and performance indicators that trigger organizations to re‐evaluate their lifetime employment practices under drastic environmental upheaval. We test our hypotheses on 574 Korean manufacturing organizations and find that under discontinuous change: (1) economic and institutional factors simultaneously apply opposite forces on organizational actions; (2) organizational factors such as poor performance on productivity and export create a need for headcount reductions while factors such as size, domestic ownership, government support, and unionization create social and institutional pressures that inhibit downsizing; and (3) prior experience with downsizing moderates the relationship between institutional factors and further downsizing.     

Executives’ Orientations as Indicators of Crisis Management Policies and Practices*

ABSTRACT The paper examines effects of executives’ orientations on crisis management awareness and practices, drawing on the simplicity and paradox management theories. It is suggested that a focus on single‐sided management constitutes an antecedent of crisis proneness. Employing a set of key corporate domains and based on a holistic organizational approach, the study aims at assessing the extent to which companies are crisis prone or prepared. In a sample of 82 Istaeli business and not‐for‐profit organizations it was found that human resource management, strategy, structure, and unlearning factors significantly predicted crisis preparedness. These results suggest that unlearning, despite a mere allusion to this correlate in the simplicity and paradox management theories, correlates better with crisis preparedness. By contrast, traditional strategy‐related and structural effects were marginally related to crisis management policies. Implications and suggestions for further research are proposed.     

The Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to Large Banks’ Capital

We propose a simple approach to quantifying the macroeconomic effects of shocks to large banks’ leverage. We first estimate a standard dynamic model of leverage targeting at the bank level and use it to derive an aggregate measure of the economic capital buffer of large US bank holding corporations. We then evaluate the response of key macro variables to a shock to this aggregate bank capital buffer using standard monetary VAR models. We find that shocks to the capital of large US banks explain a substantial share of the variance of credit to firms and real activity.