Does Tax Competition Reduce Corruption?

A vast literature asserts that competition among jurisdictions can mitigate corruption. However, empirical studies do not fully support such a conventional view. This paper points out a drawback of the conventional view, that is, it ignores the role played by the owners of immobile factors. Within a standard tax competition model, we amend the conventional view by incorporating the lobbying of the immobile factor owners, and show that fiscal decentralization can aggravate corruption. We also demonstrate that social welfare can be higher under decentralization than under centralization in some cases, whereas the immobile factor owners' lobbying will prevent such a superiority of decentralization from being the outcome. Moreover, we provide an example to show that a better policy outcome and a higher level of corruption can co‐exist, which contrasts with the general belief.     

Asymmetry Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Domestic Production: Evidence from Nonlinear ARDL Approach

Currency depreciation is said to have positive or negative effects on domestic production. Previous studies that tried to address this issue using Australian data have been inconclusive at best but mostly showed no effects. One common feature of all studies is that they have assumed that the effects of exchange rate changes are symmetric. In this paper, we use the concept of partial sum and separate appreciations from depreciations to test whether the effects are symmetric or asymmetric. Application of the nonlinear ARDL approach of Shin et al. (2014) reveals that indeed the effects of changes in the real effective exchange rate of the Australian dollar are asymmetric in the short run as well as in the long run. While in the short run both appreciations and depreciations affect Australian domestic production, only effects of appreciation last into the long run, a unique finding.     

SEPARATING EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY,AUTOMATION, AND PIKETTY'S THEORY OF INCREASING CAPITAL SHARE

Despite disincentive effects, it is more efficient to tackle inequality by general equality promotion policies, including tax/transfers, than by trying to pursue equality in specific issues or policies. The latter policy also has the same degree of disincentive effects as the general policy but has additional distortive effects. While Piketty' concern with inequality is well taken and his proposal to reduce inequality has merits, his argument on the inevitability of increasing capital share under capitalism and the condition of rate of returns to capital being larger than the rate of growth in incomes (r > g) is not correct. (JEL D3, D6, H)     

Is there Causal Relationship between Money Supply Growth and Inflation in China? Evidence from Quantity Theory of Money

This study examines the causal relationship between Chinese money supply growth and inflation, using the bootstrap Granger full‐sample causality test and sub‐sample rolling‐window estimation test to determine whether such a relationship in China supports the quantity theory of money. The result indicates that there is a unidirectional relationship from inflation to money supply growth. However, considering structural changes in two series, we find that short‐run relationships using full‐sample data are unstable, which suggests that full‐sample causality tests cannot be relied upon. Then, we use a time‐varying rolling‐window approach to revisit the dynamic causal relationship, and the results show that money supply growth has both positive and negative impacts on inflation in several sub‐periods, and in turn, inflation has the same effects on money supply growth for China. These findings are basically consistent with the modern quantity theory of money from the perspective of money supply and price level. When money supply growth does not outweigh output growth, inflation should not be curbed only by decreasing money supply. It notes that a stable money supply growth is critical to price level stability and economic development in China.     

Economic Integration,Monopoly Power and Productivity Growth without Scale Effects

This paper considers how monopoly power affects the relationship between economic integration and economic growth that is not biased by a scale effect. In a two‐country model of trade, productivity growth is generated by firm‐level investment in process innovation, and the location of economic activity is determined by relative market size, trade costs and imperfect knowledge diffusion. Equilibrium features the partial concentration of manufacturing and the full concentration of innovation in the larger country. Increased economic integration raises the concentration of manufacturing in the larger country, and when monopoly power is strong, leads to decreased product variety, accelerated productivity growth and greater national welfare. With weak monopoly power, however, it raises product variety and dampens productivity growth, but may benefit or hurt welfare.     

How Significant Is Sub‐Saharan Africa's Demographic Dividend for Its Future Growth and Poverty Reduction?

Sub‐Saharan Africa will be undergoing substantial demographic changes over the next 15 years with the rising working‐age share of its population. The opportunity of African countries to convert these changes into demographic dividends for growth and poverty reduction will depend on several factors. The outlook will likely be good if African countries can continue the gains already made under better institutions and policies, particularly those affecting the productivity of labor, such as educational outcomes. If African countries can continue to build on the hard‐won development gains, the demographic dividend could account for 11–15% of gross domestic product (GDP) volume growth by 2030, while accounting for 40–60 million fewer poor in 2030. The gains can become more substantial with better educational outcomes that allow African countries to catch up to other developing countries. If the skill share of Africa's labor supply doubles because of improvements in educational attainment, from 25 to about 50% between 2011 and 2030, then the demographic dividends can expand the regional economy additionally by 22% by 2030 relative to the base case and reduce poverty by an additional 51 million people.     

Updated trends in US brand-name and generic drug competition

Objective: To provide updated evidence on US trends in: market exclusivity periods (MEPs, time between brand-name drug launch and first generic competitors) for new molecular entities (NMEs); likelihood, timing and number of Hatch-Waxman Act Paragraph IV patent challenges; and generic drug penetration.

Methods: This study used IMS Health National Sales Perspectives^TM US data to calculate MEPs for the 288 NMEs experiencing initial generic entry between January 1995 and December 2014, the number of generic competitors for 12 months afterward (by level of annual sales prior to generic entry), and generic penetration rates. The likelihood, timing and number of Paragraph IV challengers were calculated using data from Abbreviated New Drug Approval (ANDA) letters, the FDA website, public information searches, and ParagraphFour.com.

Results: For drugs experiencing initial generic entry in 2013–2014, the MEP was 12.5 years for drugs with sales greater than $250 million (in 2008 dollars) in the year prior to generic entry ($250 million?+?NMEs), 13.6 years overall. After generic entry, brands rapidly lost sales, with their average unit share being 7% at 1 year for $250 million?+?NMEs, 12% overall. Ninety-four percent of $250 million?+?NMEs experiencing initial generic entry in 2013–2014 had faced at least one Paragraph IV challenge, an average of 5.2 years after brand launch (76% and 5.9 years for all NMEs). NMEs faced an average of 5.1 and 6.2 Paragraph IV challenges per NME, for all and $250 million?+?NMEs, respectively.

Limitations: Analyses, including Paragraph IV calculations, were restricted to NMEs where generic entry had occurred.

Conclusion: The average 2013–2014 MEP of 12.5 years for $250 million?+?NMEs, 13.6 overall remains consistent with prior research. MEPs are lower, and Paragraph IV challenges are more frequent and occur earlier for $250 million?+?drugs. Generic share erosion is also greater, and continues to intensify for both NME types.     

Improving Connectivity in Indonesia: The Challenges of Better Infrastructure,Better Regulations,and Better Coordination

This paper presents and discusses the main challenges that an archipelago like Indonesia is facing in improving its connectivity. Distinguishing between intra‐island, inter‐island, and international connectivity is essential in order to understand the nature of the challenges and causes behind the bottlenecks. High domestic shipping costs are identified as one key challenge. The Government of Indonesia has identified improved connectivity as a key issue in promoting economic growth, especially in the manufacturing sector, now that Indonesia can no longer rely on commodities as a driver of growth. Better infrastructure, regulations, and coordination among stakeholders are crucial components in promoting improved connectivity for manufacturing growth. Promoting investment in infrastructure is necessary, including both hard and soft infrastructure. However, Indonesian experience highlights that without regulatory reform and improved policy coordination, infrastructure investment will continue to lag behind. There is a need for an improved and empowered governance structure to turn investment plans into reality.     

Explaining Foreign Holdings of Asia's Debt Securities: The Feldstein–Horioka Paradox Revisited*

In this paper, we find that home bias is still present in all economies and regions, especially in the case of short‐term debt securities, but that there are substantial variations among economies and regions in the strength of home bias, with the eurozone economies, the USA and developing Asia showing relatively weak home bias and advanced Asia, especially Japan, showing relatively strong home bias. We then examine trends over time in foreign holdings of debt securities and find that capital has been flowing from the USA and the eurozone economies to both advanced Asia (especially Japan) and developing Asia, and that foreign holdings of debt securities have been increasing in advanced as well as developing Asia but for different reasons. The main reason in the case of advanced Asia (especially Japan) appears to be higher risk‐adjusted returns, whereas the main reason in the case of developing Asia appears to be the growth of debt securities markets combined with relatively weak home bias and (in the case of short‐term securities) lower exchange rate volatility. Finally, we find that since the global financial crisis, foreign holdings of debt securities have declined (i.e. that home bias has strengthened) in all economies and regions except developing Asia, where they have increased (except for a temporary decline in 2008) but where their share is still much lower than the optimal share warranted by the capital asset pricing market model.