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221.
Kwanho Shin 《China Economic Journal》2017,10(2):226-243
ABSTRACTQuantitative easing (QE) conducted by the US Fed during 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q2 expanded capital flows into emerging economies. The possibility of tapering to reduce QE caused the taper tantrum in 2013 that was characterized by sudden capital reversals and drastic exchange rate depreciation in a subset of developing countries. In this paper we investigated factors that drove capital reversals and drastic exchange rate depreciation in the developing countries. We find that actual capital inflows during the QE periods were most responsible for capital reversals thereafter. However, we do not find evidence that capital flow reversals actually contributed to the drastic exchange rate depreciation during the taper tantrum or lowered real GDP growth afterwards. Consistent with previous studies Our findings suggest that pre-emptive measures to prevent excessive capital inflows are crucial to promote the resilience of the economy. The recent experience of Korea that introduced a series of macroprudential measures shows supporting evidence for this view.Abbreviations: EG: Eichengreen and Gupta (2015); IFS: International Financial Statistics; PRS: Park, Ramayandi, and Shin (2016); US Fed: U.S. Federal Reserve System 相似文献
222.
Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront
of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly
describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize
executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues,
and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive
compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation
committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase
institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense
stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation,
and describe possible future research. 相似文献
223.
224.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading perspectives in management and organizational studies, yet debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer several strategies for doing this. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
225.
226.
Summary. When economic agents have diverse private information on the fundamentals of the economy, prices may serve as a poor aggregator of this private information. We examine the information value of prices in a monopolistic competition setting that has become standard in the New Keynesian macroeconomics literature. We show that public information has a disproportionate effect on agents’ decisions, crowds out private information, and thereby has the potential to degrade the information value of prices. This effect is strongest in an economy with keen price competition. Monetary policy must rely on less informative signals of the underlying cost conditions.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 19 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers:
E31, E32, E58.This paper supersedes the discussion in the first half of our longer paper that circulated under the title “Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models”. We thank Andy Filardo, Marvin Goodfriend, Nobu Kiyotaki, John Moore, Stephen Morris and Lars Svensson for advice and comments at various stages of the project, and to Herakles Polemarchakis, Roko Aliprantis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and guidance. The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS. The second author acknowledges support from the U.K. ESRC under grant RES 000220450. Correspondence to: H.S. Shin 相似文献
227.
We study a principal–agent model in which the principal has a production technology. The efficiency parameter of the principal’s
technology is not known to the agent. Alternatively, the principal can make the agent use a technology from a different channel.
By gathering information at a cost, the agent can be informed privately of the efficiency of the technology that he may acquire
from another source. We find that the principal requires the agent to adopt the principal’s technology more (less) often when
the cost of gathering information on the other technology is small (large). Also, with two states of nature, the outcome is
first-best when the information gathering cost is intermediate.
相似文献
228.
We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross‐licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross‐licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross‐licensing agreements are derived. 相似文献
229.
230.
The language that signals conformity to a prevailing norm can contribute to the appearance of managerial competency and organizational legitimacy. We argue that top corporate managers’ use of language that is congruent with a prevailing norm leads the boards of directors to evaluate the managers more favourably and to grant a higher level of compensation. We test this argument by analysing the letters to shareholders from 334 US firms and examine the CEOs’ expression of the shareholder value principle, which is a prevailing model of corporate governance in the USA. We found that the use of shareholder‐value language is significantly related to a higher level of CEO compensation and that the effect of shareholder‐value language is greater when shareholder activism is stronger. 相似文献