Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

Labor Union Effect on Corporate Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

By using panel data from Korean listed firms, we find that unionized firms strategically hold less cash to enhance their bargaining power against labor unions. We also find that unionized firms are likely to reduce the marginal value of their cash holdings, thereby decreasing shareholder value from the agency theory perspective. This finding complements the agency theory argument that managers tend to waste corporate resources by hoarding cash, particularly when faced with increased information asymmetry and financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that information-related financial constraints and agency problems are likely to co-exist in unionized firms.     

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination†

We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions. When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.     

Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two components—(i) loyalty, with which the manager values the organization's profit, and (ii) selfishness, with which the manager values the monetary transfer he receives from the entrepreneur. We find that if the manager's task is easy enough, it is optimal to use a purely loyal manager. Otherwise, it can be optimal to use a manager with mixture of loyalty and selfishness—the manager's mixed motivation alleviates the entrepreneur's misrepresenting incentive, and as a result, the output distortion in the optimal contract can be reduced. In addition, when it is optimal to use a manager with mixed motivations, the entrepreneur selects someone who is more selfish than loyal.     

Corporate Strategies and Performances of Korean Firms: The Unified Theory of the Firm Perspective

Abstract

A good understanding of the nature of the firm is essential in developing corporate strategies, building corporate competitiveness, and establishing sound economic policy. Several theories have emerged on the nature of the firm: the neo-classical theory of the firm, the principal agency theory, the transaction cost theory, the property rights theory, the resource-based theory and the evolutionary theory. Each of these theories identify some elements that describe the nature of the firm, but no single theory is comprehensive enough to include all elements of the nature of the firm.

Economists began to seek a theory capable of describing the nature of the firm within a single, all-encompassing, coherent framework. We propose a unified theory of the firm, which encompasses all elements of the firm. We then evaluate performances of Korean firms from the unified theory of the firm perspective. Empirical evidences are promising in support of the integrative theory of the firm.     

Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?

Integrating planning and implementation, by having one agent perform both tasks, may be effective in encouraging planning activity whose outcome is not observable. Emphasizing its information-generating role, we find that planning activity is best encouraged by partially integrating the tasks. This is because the value of information is nonmonotonic in the degree of task integration. Therefore, the threat of using a second agent to implement the project may relax the moral hazard constraint associated with the planning task. The project size is distorted to increase the value of information, and there can be overinvestment relative to the first best.     

OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO, CONSUMPTION-LEISURE AND RETIREMENT CHOICE PROBLEM WITH CES UTILITY

We study optimal portfolio, consumption-leisure and retirement choice of an infinitely lived economic agent whose instantaneous preference is characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of consumption and leisure. We integrate in one model the optimal consumption-leisure-work choice, the optimal portfolio selection, and the optimal stopping problem in which the agent chooses her retirement time. The economic agent derives utility from both consumption and leisure, and is able to adjust her supply of labor flexibly above a certain minimum work-hour, and also has a retirement option. We solve the problem analytically by considering a variational inequality arising from the dual functions of the optimal stopping problem. The optimal retirement time is characterized as the first time when her wealth exceeds a certain critical level. We provide the critical wealth level for retirement and characterize the optimal consumption-leisure and portfolio policies before and after retirement in closed forms. We also derive properties of the optimal policies. In particular, we show that consumption in general jumps around retirement.     

NEW EVIDENCE ON REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY WITHIN EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE MATCHES

In the most thorough study to date on wage cyclicality among job stayers, Devereux's (2001) analysis of men in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) produced two puzzling findings: (1) the real wages of salaried workers are noncyclical, and (2) wage cyclicality among hourly workers differs between two alternative wage measures. We examine these puzzles with additional evidence from other sources. Devereux's finding of noncyclical real wages among salaried job stayers is not replicated in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data. The NLSY data, however, do corroborate his finding of a discrepancy for hourly workers between the cyclicality of the two alternative wage measures. Evidence from the PSID Validation Study contradicts Devereux's conjecture that the discrepancy might be due to a procyclical bias from measurement error in average hourly earnings. Evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey supports his hypothesis that overtime work accounts for part (but not all) of the discrepancy. We conclude that job stayers' real average hourly earnings are substantially procyclical and that an important portion of that procyclicality probably is due to compensation beyond base wages.     

反向的民主化：第三波民主的问题

第三波民主化浪潮中的国家,多在建立法治、公民社会、领导人问责制等现代国家的基本制度之前建立了自由选举制度。相反,第一波民主化的国家则在普选引入之前已经先建立了现代的国家制度。第三波民主化中这种反方向的民主化造成了在大多数国家中形成的是不完全的民主制度。不完全的民主有三种发展前景:(1)继续向前,完成民主化;(2)民主选举制度失败,转向一种不民主的制度;(3)在统治精英低效但公众对民主政治要求也低的情况下,更会堕入一种低水平平衡的陷阱。本文通过分析三个新民主国家的大众观念调查数据,展示这样一种不完全民主的各种问题。这三个国家的前身各不相同:过去属于专制体制的俄罗斯、过去曾有民主和专制的捷克、过去是专制军事政权的韩国。