Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.     

在衰退中成长

如今,全球都笼罩在经济衰退之中.如果下一个就要轮到贵公司,你该怎么办?当然你要尽力保证企业财务的稳定.但更重要的是,你还必须了解公司在衰退结束后的目标设计.如果你知道企业的发展方向和如何实现这一目标,那么衰退时期是改善公司相对战略地位的好时机.     

Contract modifications and the basis behavior of live cattle futures

The purpose of this study was to assess the basis behavior of the Live Cattle Futures contract at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) before and after the 1995 contract changes. Additionally, an alternative method of basis calculation utilizing weighted mean futures prices versus settlement futures prices was compared to determine which method provides a better representation of the basis level. Within a regression model with heteroskedascity error framework, we found that the level of nearby basis in the period after June 1995 has shifted lower and the average monthly open interest of net commercial long positions has substantially increased after the contract modifications. These empirical results are consistent with the notion that more long activity entered the market in response to the contract modifications. Additionally, an alternative (new) measure of basis calculation (cash price minus weighted mean futures price) produced similar results to two other commonly used measures. In conclusion, the 1995 contract changes have neither increased nor decreased the volatility of live cattle basis. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:557–590, 2004     

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behaviour of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, that portfolio investors and hedge funds played a dominant role in initiating and/or spreading the crisis; that moral hazard kept efficient markets from predicting the crisis; and, finally, the common lender hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart. In the process we also test implications of the Calvo-Mendoza model of rational investor ignorance. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong forms should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is necessary to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.