Shareholder Value Maximisation,Stock Market and New Technology: Should the US Corporate Model be the Universal Standard? 1

In 1992 a blue‐ribbon group of US economists led by Michael Porter concluded that the US stock market‐based corporate model was misallocating resources and jeopardising US competitiveness. The faster growth of US economy since then and the supposed US lead in the spread of information technology has brought new legitimacy to the stock market and the corporate model, which is being hailed as the universal standard. Two main conclusions of the analysis presented here are: (a) there is no warrant for revising the blue‐ribbon group’s conclusion; and (b) even US corporations let alone developing country ones would be better off not having stock market valuation as a corporate goal.     

Liquidity constrained exporters and trade

We present a model of a risk-averse exporting firm subject to liquidity constraints. We show that preferences and expectations become important for optimum export and hedging decisions. Only firms that have sufficient financial resources can fully materialize gains from trade.     

Neuroeconomics as a Natural Extension of Bioeconomics: The Shifting Scope of Standard Economic Theory

Synopsis Neuroeconomics rightly has been claimed to be a natural extension of bioeconomics. One of the things bioeconomics investigates is what behavioral dispositions and what behavioral patterns evolutionary processes have produced. Neuroeconomics extends this to the study of evolved mechanisms that are at work in decision-making at the neural level of the brain. The paper argues that in another respect neuroeconomics and bioeconomics are discontinuous, however. Bioeconomics maintains that the applicability of standard economic theory’s constrained maximization framework is not confined to human behavior. The constrained maximization framework is believed to be suitable to describe behavior throughout the animal kingdom. By contrast, despite some minor internal disagreements all neuroeconomists seem to agree that human behavior is predicted poorly by standard economic theory in several social and economic situations. Neuroscience is believed to hold out the hope of an advanced understanding of when and why this is the case.      

Financial Deregulation and the Role of Statecraft: Lessons from Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control Measures

Within the financialisation literature, a number of approaches identify the coexistence of financial expansion and productive stagnation. Yet there is no consensus on which direction causality operates between these two phenomena. This impasse has been widened by the lack of attention paid to the role of statecraft strategies in mediating possible causal mechanisms. This article contributes to rectifying this shortcoming by focusing on the governance advantages granted to states through financial deregulation. By presenting archival evidence on Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control deregulation, this article lends support to financialisation accounts that argue that weaknesses in the productive economy spurred financial expansion, yet it also indicates that the state’s desire for depoliticised forms of governance played a crucial role in mediating this relationship. This further suggests that International Political Economy should focus on the strategic manner in which states relate to markets.     

The comparative statics of cumulative distribution function changes for the class of risk averse agents

We examine the connection between Walrasian equilibria of a limit economy (with infinitesimal firms) and the noncooperative (Cournot) equilibria of approximating finite economies (with significant firms). Following earlier work of Novshek and Sonnenschein we allow for set-up cost and permit a minimal form of mixed strategies. We depart from them by requiring that the aggregate production set exhibits some degree (however small) of decreasing returns. Contrasting with their results, it is shown that a (regular) Walrasian equilibrium of a limit economy can always be approximated by a sequence of noncooperative equilibria for the tail of the approximating (finite) economies. Thus, there is a surprising qualitative discontinuity when one passes from the Novshek-Sonnenschein case of aggregate constant returns to scale of the decreasing returns case of this paper.     

我看电子商务

我经常说的一个例子,就是美国东部的羊群和西部的羊群是一个品种,但东部的羊的身体状况完全不一样,因为东部有狼,羊要不停地奔跑.但是西部没有狼,羊的日子过得挺好.……     

The Dangers of Misclassifying “Employees”: Microsoft Litigation Emphasizes Distinctions Between Employees and Nontraditional Workers

In the past decade, businesses, for reasons such as greater flexibility and lower total costs, have increased their use of nontraditional workers such as independent contractors and temporary agency employees. The Internal Revenue Service's crackdown on misclassifying employees slowed this growth. Additionally, recent lawsuits by nontraditional workers against employers such as Microsoft Corporation have resulted in some client employers being forced to pay more benefits to nontraditional employees because of employment misclassification and coemployment rulings. Such rulings might reduce or even eliminate the use of some types of nontraditional employees. This paper analyzes the vast array of types of workers that have evolved into the nontraditional work force and the difficulty of defining employee with respect to entitlement to employer benefits. Possible recommendations for employers include auditing present use of nontraditional workers, accurately classifying employees, and taking proper actions to minimize problems in the future.     

Rent extraction,principal–agent relationships,and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta

Two‐part pricing, price‐discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal–agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor‐license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal–agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.