Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior

The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results. The information includes “official” information disseminated by the tax authority, and “unofficial”, or informal, communications among taxpayers. Our results indicate that the effect of the type of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well informed of the audit rate prior to filing. We find that the tax authority would be served by pre-announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort.     

Tests of Hypotheses Arising In the Correlated Random Coefficient Model

This paper examines the correlated random coefficient model. It extends the analysis of Swamy (1971), who pioneered the uncorrelated random coefficient model in economics. We develop the properties of the correlated random coefficient model and derive a new representation of the variance of the instrumental variable estimator for that model. We develop tests of the validity of the correlated random coefficient model against the null hypothesis of the uncorrelated random coefficient model.     

Does trade foster contract enforcement?

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development. Presented to the GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’, 8 and 9 June, 2007. An earlier version of this paper under another title was presented to the American Economic Association meetings, January 2004.     

Do former athletes make better managers? Evidence from a partially adaptive grouped-data regression model

The goal of this paper is to introduce a partially adaptive estimator for the grouped-data regression model based on an error structure described by a mixture of two normal distributions. The model we introduce is easily estimated by maximum likelihood using the EM algorithm adapted from the work of Bartolucci and Scaccia (Comput Stat Data Anal 48:821–834, 2005). The partially adaptive estimator is applied to data used by Long and Caudill (Rev Econ Stat 73:525–531, 1991) to examine the impact of intercollegiate athletics on income. We estimate a variation of the original regression model and find that there is a considerable financial advantage for those male athletes now working in business management. This finding is consistent with the idea that athletes acquire team-building and organizational skills that are helpful in business.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.     

Long waves in prices: new evidence from wavelet analysis

In this paper we apply wavelet analysis to study the dynamics of long-term movements in wholesale prices for the USA, the UK and France over the period 1791–2012. The application of wavelet analysis to long-term historical price series allows us to detect long waves in prices whose periodization is remarkably similar to those provided in the literature for the pre-World War II period. Moreover, we find evidence on the existence of long waves in prices also after World War II, a period in which long waves are generally difficult to detect because of the positive trend displayed by prices. The comparison between the long wave components extracted through wavelets and the Christiano–Fitzgerald band-pass filter suggests that wavelets provide a reliable and straightforward technique for analyzing long waves dynamics in time series exhibiting quite complex patterns such as historical data.     

Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

This paper examines the relation between incentive pay, monitoring, and regulatory requirements in banks. Using a one-period model with asymmetrical information between the bank owner and the top management team, as well as within the team itself, we show that (1) incentive pay increases the mutual-monitoring activity among top executives; (2) senior executives, especially the CEO, collect more incentive pay than their subordinates; and (3) bank regulations, such as capital adequacy (CAD) requirements, reduce the absolute amount of incentive pay granted to executives.     

Preventing HIV in injection drug users: exploring the tradeoffs between interventions

Injection drug users (IDUs) transmit the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) via both needle sharing and sex. Available interventions for this population have varying costs and effectiveness and focus on different risk behaviors. In this analysis, we look at two interventions. One is inexpensive, broad-based and provides modest risk reductions (street outreach (SO)); the other is narrowly focused, expensive and relatively effective (methadone maintenance). This analysis explores the effects of population risk behavior, intervention effectiveness, intervention costs, and decision constraints when allocating funds between these two interventions to maximize effectiveness. We develop a model of the spread of HIV, dividing IDUs into susceptibles (uninfected) and infectives, and separately portraying sex and injection risk. We simulate the epidemic in New York City for time periods from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and incorporate the behavioral effects of two interventions performed singly or in combination to find the allocation that maximizes the number of infections averted in the IDUs and their noninjecting sex partners, assuming interventions have increasing marginal costs. We find that the optimal allocation nearly always involves spending the maximum allowable amount on SO. This result is largely insensitive to variations in risk parameters, intervention efficacy, or cost. The model's structure, however, makes clear that many factors contribute to this insensitivity, namely the scope of the interventions, the dual drug/sex nature of HIV risk in the population, the asymmetry of sexual risk for men and women, and the potential benefits to nonIDUs.