This Little Piggy Went to Market with a Passport: The Impacts of U.S. Country of Origin Labeling on the Canadian Pork Sector

This paper examines the potential impacts of U.S. mandatory country of origin labeling. North American hog and pork markets are represented as vertically related in a partial equilibrium non-spatial model. A synthetic model is calibrated to historic data and then used to trace the program's added costs as they are passed through the market to determine who wins and who loses. The transactions costs reduce the welfare of all agents in the United States. Canadian welfare depends primarily on whether mixed supply chains continue to be accepted in the United States and trade in hogs continues. A closed border significantly reduces the welfare of Canadian hog producers and increases the welfare of Canadian pork processors.
Le présent article porte sur les répercussions éventuelles de l'étiquetage obligatoire du pays d'origine réclamée par les États‐Unis. Les marchés nord-américains du porc vivant et de la viande de porc sont représentés comme étant verticalement liés dans un modèle non spatial d'équilibre partiel. Un modèle synthétique est étalonné avec des données historiques et est ensuite utilisé pour déterminer les coûts supplémentaires qu'occasionne le programme à mesure qu'ils sont répartis sur le marché pour déterminer les gagnants et les perdants. Les coûts de transaction diminuent le bien‐être de tous les agents aux États‐Unis. Le bien-être au Canada dépend principalement de l'acceptation ou non des chaînes d'approvisionnement mixtes et de la continuité ou non du commerce du porc vivant. La fermeture des frontières diminue considérablement le bien-être des producteurs de porcs canadiens et augmente celui des transformateurs de porcs canadiens.     

The structure of marketing channel relationships

Distribution channel research has been advanced in recent years by contributions based on the political economy paradigm, transaction cost analysis, and relationship marketing. Drawing on these bodies of thought, we propose a new conceptualization of the structure of marketing channel relationships. Relationship structure is defined in terms of decision-making structure and operational integration. The proposed model of channel structure antecedents and consequences is consistent with the major research paradigms but extends beyond simple categorical assemblages of constructs to provide an ordered set of relationships based on theory and empirical research. This conceptualization reconciles some apparent contradictions in the literature and provides a clear focus for structure, process, and performance research in channels. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Louisiana State University. He has published in the areas of marketing channels, retailing, and logistics. His work has appeared in theJournal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Marketing Channels, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management, Journal of Marketing Education, and others. He served as the managing director of public relations with the Federal Express Corporation before entering the Ph.D. program at Alabama. He holds a B.B.A. in accountancy from the University of Mississippi and an M.A. in marketing from the University of Alabama.     

Risk and the miller equilibrium: Capital structure choice with risk-averse investors

Merton Miller's (1977) tax model of equilibrium capital structure choice results in capital structure irrelevance and the existence of tax clienteles, assuming the restrictive case of risk-neutrality. Relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality in Miller's tax framework, allowing utility-maximizing risk-averse investors, indicates that capital structure irrelevance continues to hold under reasonable assumptions about utility. Evaluation of resulting tax clienteles shows that marginal tax rates do not restrict investors from investing in equities but do affect the tax status of purchased bonds.     

Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks

Consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concern about the survival of small banks, particularly as it relates to the availability of credit to small businesses. However, if small banks have an advantage in processing credit information, compared to large banks, they should continue to survive in a competitive environment. We evaluate risk-adjusted commercial loan yields (gross yields less net charge-offs and the risk-free rate of return) at small and large banks for the period of 1996 through 2001. Our primary finding is that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than larger banks. This result suggests that small banks make better choices from the available small business loans and is consistent with the notion that these banks have an information advantage in evaluating credit.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.     

Developing a cost-benefit analysis process for small-to-moderate expenditure decisions

During the Reagan administration, the federal government mandated the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) for regulatory decisions involving $100 million or more. While the use of CBAs has increased, less attention has been given to CBA processes involving smaller expenditures (regulatory and nonregulatory). As the federal budget tightens in the years ahead, the need to make hard decisions about these policies, programs, and technologies will increase. This paper describes a CBA process developed for the Office of Strategic Planning of the Social Security Administration; it was designed to handle small-to-moderate expenditure decisions (or for preliminary estimates of larger undertakings). A sample CBA using this process is provided, along with a discussion of the lessons that were learned from an initial application.