The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

The establishment-size wage premium: evidence from European countries

This study examines the magnitude and determinants of the establishment-size wage premium in five European countries using a unique harmonised matched employer–employee data set (the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey). This data set enables to test the validity of various traditional explanations of the size wage gap (i.e. the labour quality hypothesis, the theory of compensating wage differentials, the role of monitoring and institutions) and of more recent hypotheses (i.e. size differences in job stability and in the concentration of skilled workers). We find some support for traditional explanations, but there remains a significant wage premium for workers employed in large establishments. Further results indicate that the magnitude of this premium fluctuates substantially across countries and appears to be negatively correlated with the degree of corporatism.     

Urbanization effects on survey nonresponse: a test within and across cities

This paper addresses differences in survey response across city size by applying an explanation from House and Wolf to areas within cities. The data are from Toronto, Hamilton and Kitchener, in Canada. Consistent with other literature, response falls sharply from largest to smallest place, but variation in response rates within the cities is negligible. The intra-city analysis is accomplished by factor analyzing variables such as population density, crime rate and ethnic structure, mostly computed for census tracts, into a variable labelled social disorganization. What House and Wolf termed compositional variation in response is handled by record linking with municipal assessment information. The analysis is based on micro data taking the people listed for the sample as unit of observation.     

The transformational management of conflict: A perspective from the early Christian church

An understanding of transformational leadership has been developed for many spheres of management, but not previously for organizational conflict. This paper analyzes a successful conflict mediation attempt in the early Christian church and draws from it elements of a model of the transformational management of conflict that can be applied by managers in many contemporary work organizations. The elements include (a) reframing the conflict, (b) a focus on a shared organizational vision, (c) the placement of responsibility for dispute resolution in the hands of organizational members directly and indirectly involved in conflict, and (d) the use of communication devices consistent with the desired outcome. The paper suggests skills necessary for managers to implement the model and implications for research on it.     

Self-control in peer groups

Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging.     

Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

Assessing the international spillover effects of capital income taxation

Changes in capital taxes by one economy spill onto other economies with internationally mobile capital. We evaluate these impacts using a two-region, intertemporal general equilibrium model. The foreign economy's unilateral reduction in corporate income taxation has positive but small effects on U.S. welfare. In contrast, unilateral reductions in personal income taxation impose large negative spillovers. The differences result from CIT being source-based and PIT residence-based. The CIT cut reduces tax burdens to U.S. residents who invest abroad, while the PIT cut reduces foreigners' tax burdens only. Through general equilibrium adjustments neglected in simpler models, the PIT cut lowers U.S. residents' welfare.     

Is there a pecking order? Evidence from a panel of IPO firms

We test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983. We estimate a logit to predict external financing, and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the IPO firms' security offerings during 1984–1992. Our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds, although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing. Firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer.