Governance And The Implementation Of Technology Policy In Less Developed Countries

This study discusses key issues of technology policy in less developed countries from a governance perspective. In particular, it analyzes critical problems of policy implementation and looks for general principles which may be suitable as guideposts in making the state more effective regardless of the particularities of its technology policy. The main argument is that governments need to assume a market-enhancing role and must enhance the state's capabilities and capacities for implementing public policies. Crafting public institutions which ensure accountability, transparency, and predictability of policy making and involve the private sector in political decision-making processes is critical for successful policy implementation. Besides institutional arrangements which help governments to credibly precommit to policies, the quality and institutional design of the public administration and the public-private interface are crucial ingredients of an effective governance structure.     

Can France meet the Maastricht Criteria? slower economic growth poses new challenges to economic policy makers

Conclusion With its 1996 budget the French government has all but completely abandoned its election promises. At the same time, in economic policy terms it has gained credibility amongst its partners in the EU. Following the announcement of the fiscal consolidation measures the franc initially strengthened and the central bank was able to reduce short-term interest rates slightly for the first time since July 1994. There is still a chance that France will be able to meet the criteria for joining European Economic and Monetary Union if the country proves able to counter the current trend towards a weakening of economic growth in 1996 and 1997. Although the recent wave of strikes indicates that the cutbacks have gone as far as was possible, fiscal policy is not in a position to stimulate demand if it is to avoid undermining the aim of meeting the 3% criterion at the appointed time. This makes a perceptible cut in real interest rates all the more necessary. This in turn requires a substantial stimulus by the monetary authorities, and this is only conceivable within the framework of concerted action at European level.     

How Big is the Crowding-Out Effect of User Fees in the Rural Areas of Ethiopia? Implications for Equity and Resources Mobilization

Using a nested multinomial logit model, this study investigates the demand “reduction” and “diversion” effects of user fees in rural areas of Ethiopia. The results reveal that an increase in user fees of public clinics, which are the most widely used alternative, can have a significant demand reduction effect on the poorest of the poor. This implies that despite cost recovery has been advocated as an alternative means of health care financing in most of the developing world, increasing user fees may drive the poorest segment of the population out of the health care market unless some protective measures are taken.     

Statistical Analysis of Choice Experiments and Surveys

Measures of households' past behavior, their expectations with respect to future events and contingencies, and their intentions with respect to future behavior are frequently collected using household surveys. These questions are conceptually difficult. Answering them requires elaborate cognitive and social processes, and often respondents report only their “best” guesses and/or estimates, using more or less sophisticated heuristics. A large body of literature in psychology and survey research shows that as a result, responses to such questions may be severely biased. In this paper, (1) we describe some of the problems that are typically encountered, (2) provide some empirical illustrations of these biases, and (3) develop a framework for conceptualizing survey response behavior and for integrating structural models of response behavior into the statistical analysis of the underlying economic behavior.     

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO EXPLAINING BARGAINING BEHAVIOUR IN SIMPLE SEQUENTIAL GAMES

Abstract.  For simple sequential games, the payoff structure has certain bargaining power implication. Intuitively, certain actions may have the effect of the carrot and the stick as sanctioning means. Fair outcomes can be alternatively viewed as the consequence of their presence. Experimental data on various games are used to test the hypothesis of carrot and stick behaviour. We show that our stick and carrot heuristic neatly captures puzzling phenomena in a wide class of simple sequential games. The results support the view that punishing subjects are not worse off than myopic pay-off maximizers as long as subjects are involved in a repeated strangers scheme.