Determinacy with nominal assets and outside money

Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.Received: 2 July 2003, Revised: 1 December 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D50, E40, E50, E58.Correspondence to: J. Geanakoplos     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Industrial cogeneration and regulatory policy

The 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) fostered decentralized generation of electricity, particularly in the form of cogeneration. A model of a firms' decision to cogenerate is developed that illustrates both the interface between the firm and an electric utility, and the firm's internal interface between its primary product and cogeneration technologies. The model is used to show that the firm may operate inefficiently in both the short run and long run owing to the fixed-proportions technology of cogeneration and PURPA mandated operating procedures, respectively. Cogenerating firms that dump heat into the atmosphere may signal inefficient behavior; therefore, monitoring heat dumping may be important in measuring the success of cogeneration.     

Monopsony power and the existence of natural monopoly in energy utilities

The justification for price and entry regulation of firms hinges on whether the firms are natural monopolies, and empirical tests have been used to determine the natural monopoly status of public utilities. However, these tests are biased if the utilities possess monopsony power - a likely case. The bias is against finding natural monopoly status, which can lead to improper policies. An alternative method of testing is proposed which eliminates the bias.     

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark     

The Timing of Purchases and Aggregate Fluctuations

We study the cyclical effects of the timing of durable goods purchases in a general equilibrium model in which both durable and non-durable goods are consumed and the durable good is lumpy. At the microeconomic level, the timing of durable goods purchases supplies some insulation for non-durable consumption over the cycle. At the macroeconomic level, the timing decisions tend to amplify and propagate wealth and income shocks. Our model also allows for endogenous price determination. When the price of the durable changes due to inflexibility of workers between sectors, the effect of adverse shocks is even stronger and longer.