Passive Investment Strategies and Efficient Markets

This paper presents the case for and the evidence in favour of passive investment strategies and examines the major criticisms of the technique. I conclude that the evidence strongly supports passive investment management in all markets—small–capitalisation stocks as well as large–capitalisation equities, US markets as well as international markets, and bonds as well as stocks. Recent attacks on the efficient market hypothesis do not weaken the case for indexing.     

The Effect of Endogenous Regulation on Telecommunications Expansion and Efficiency in Latin America

I examine the effect of reform on telecom performance using a second-generation regulatory framework index and panel data techniques to test how regulatory governance affected sector performance in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980–1997. Sound regulatory governance in telecommunications has a positive impact on network expansion and efficiency, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Openness of markets to competition and divestment of former state-owned telco operators also contributed positively to better sector performance. The dynamic specification shows that past performance has its own strong effect on present (and perhaps future) performance.     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Testing Rival Theories of Budgetary Decision–making in the US States

This article tests three common budgetary decision–making theories in the US states. Pooled time series cross–section analysis is used from 1960 to 1996 to test the garbage can theory and incrementalism, and from 1989 to 1996 to test various theories of rational budgeting. The results demonstrate that there was some support for all three theories in terms of their impact on reducing state budget outputs. Rational budgeting reduces expenditures in aggregate, incrementalism has relatively low explanatory power below the aggregates, and garbage can budgeting is more prevalent in functional areas than for government as a whole. These findings imply that the future research agenda on budgetary decision–making theories should focus more on a system–wide approach, which takes into account many of the characteristics of all three rival models of decision–making, rather than exclusively focusing on each one singly.     

Density estimation in the uniform deconvolution model

We consider the problem of estimating a probability density function based on data that are corrupted by noise from a uniform distribution. The (nonparametric) maximum likelihood estimator for the corresponding distribution function is well defined. For the density function this is not the case. We study two nonparametric estimators for this density. The first is a type of kernel density estimate based on the empirical distribution function of the observable data. The second is a kernel density estimate based on the MLE of the distribution function of the unobservable (uncorrupted) data.     

Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems

Summary. Although not assumed explicitly, we show that neutrality plays an important role in Arrow and other impossibility theorems. Applying it to pivotal voters we produce direct proofs of classical impossibility theorems, including Arrow's, as well as extend some of these theorems. We further explore the role of neutrality showing that it is equivalent to Pareto or reverse Pareto, and to effective dictatorship for non-null social welfare functions satisfying the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is also equivalent to Wilson's Citizens' Sovereignty--which is related to the intuition that symmetry over alternatives makes social preference depend only on citizens' preferences. We show that some of these results are more fundamental than others in that they extend both to infinite societies and to considerably smaller domains of preferences. Finally, as an application of Arrow's theorem, we provide a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Received: 13 April 2000, Revised: 6 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70.I thank Salvador Barberá, Luis Corchón, Cesar Martinelli, Eric Maskin, Tomas Sjöström, Ricard Torres, José Pedro Ubeda, and an anonymous referee for feedback. The proofs of Arrow's theorem and two Wilson's theorems come from a note I wrote in 1987 at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Ubeda [16]). In 1996 Geanakoplos [7] wrote a proof of Arrow's theorem similar but not identical to mine. All work in this paper is independent of his.     

Getting the Most Out of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Requirement

Recent advances in asset pricing—the reduced-form approach to pricing risky debt and derivatives—are used to quantitatively evaluate several proposals for mandatory bank issue of subordinated debt. We find that credit spreads on both fixed- and floating-rate subordinated debt provide relatively clean signals of bank risk and are not unduly influenced by nonrisk factors. Fixed-rate debt with a put is unacceptable, but making the putable debt floating resolves most problems. Our approach also helps to clarify several different notions of “bank risk.”     

An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.     

DURATION MOMENTS AND YIELD CURVE MOVEMENTS

In this paper we will analyze the relationship between the value and duration moments of a cash flow and movements in the yield curve. We will show that for changes in the yield curve which can be related to tⁿ , the 1st order changes in the net present value of a cash flow are linearly dependent on the n + lth duration moments, and that the 2nd order changes are dependent on the sum of duration moments of order 2 n + 1 and 2 n + 2. We will use this relationship to tilt tracking portfolios so as to protect them against specific changes in the yield curve.