CDS contract initiations: REIT board monitoring and corporate decision outcomes

In this article, we investigate whether the negative creditor governance shock due to the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) contracts results in monitoring substitution effects between bondholders and shareholders. Using several mechanisms to test increased shareholder monitoring such as board structure, CEO–chair duality, and institutional ownership, we show that shareholder monitoring increases post-CDS contract initiation. We examine board decision outcomes and show that incentive compensation is higher for real estate investment trusts (REITs) post-CDS initiation. Furthermore, we find that post-CDS initiation, REITs undertake more acquisitions that are more likely to be paid for with stocks and take longer to complete than non-REITs. Finally, we find that REITs industry-adjusted cash holdings and dividend yield increases post-CDS initiation.     

A partial least squares approach to digital finance adoption

In present times, the adoption and adaption of technology have become empirical. This paper helps in determining the factors of perceived risk and perceived benefits in order to understand the willingness or hesitance of people to adopt digital finance. An attempt is made to study the influence of perceived risk and benefit as the determinants of digital finance adoption. The data were collected from individuals of Northern India through a structured questionnaire. The study collected data from 411 respondents through a structured questionnaire. Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling has been adopted to analyze the data through SmartPLSv2. For better understanding, perceived risk constituted three constructs-Security risk, financial risk and performance risk, and perceived benefit included seamless transaction, economic benefit and convenience. The research concluded that both perceived risk and benefits influence the adoption of digital finance. Perceived benefit has more impact on digital finance adoption than perceived risk. The findings of the paper are beneficial for digital finance service providers and marketers to enhance the awareness and advantages of digital finance according to the needs of consumers. The present study adds value to the existing literature on the relationship between perceived risk, perceived benefit and adoption of digital finance.

     

Institutional ownership and the informativeness of disclosure tone

Disclosure tone is an important qualitative characteristic of managerial disclosures. There is mixed evidence on the role of tone in disclosure strategy. While some studies highlight the informativeness of disclosure tone, other studies provide evidence consistent with an information obfuscation role. We conjecture that the mixed evidence may be because prior studies have not explicitly modeled the role of oversight over managerial disclosure. Using an exogenous shock to institutional ownership, an important source of managerial oversight, we find that abnormal disclosure tone is informative of a firm's future earnings and cash flows when institutional ownership is high. This positive association between institutional ownership and informativeness of abnormal tone is stronger when there is an increase in quasi-indexer institutional ownership and the contemporaneous performance is negative. Collectively, the results highlight a more complex role for disclosure tone. Abnormal disclosure tone could be reflective of managerial sentiment and convey forward-looking information to investors in the presence of greater oversight over managerial actions.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.