To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation

Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within‐country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm‐level governance and transparency data from 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices, and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor‐friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.     

Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over- and under-investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under-investment but increases over-investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under-investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over-investment incentive.     

Debt and Input Misallocation

We investigate a class of agency costs of debt that arise because debt financing affects the firm's incentives to use inputs efficiently. A methodology for estimating this class of costs is presented and applied to a major industry, air transport. Our results are consistent with agency models that predict a decrease in efficiency as the debt increases. A part of the loss of efficiency that we identify is attributable to the greater use by levered firms of inputs that can be monitored and are collateralizable.     

Two Pitfalls of Linearization Methods

This paper illustrates two types of pitfalls when linearization methods are improperly applied. First, if we linearize the constraints before deriving the optimality conditions, the derived conditions are not correct up to first order. Second, even when we obtain the behavior of the economy that is correct to the first order, applying this behavior to welfare implications may lead to incorrect results. We also review different ways to avoid those pitfalls.     

UNION EFFECT ON THE USE OF NON‐REGULAR LABOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Our paper aims at analyzing the union effect on the externalization of employment relations, focusing on how labor unions affect management's strategic use of non‐regular labor within the Korean context of industrial relations. Our study presents several interesting implications. Firstly, the unions' motivator role for managerial use of non‐regular labor is more evident than its constrainer role. Secondly, union power exerts a “U‐type” impact on the use of indirect non‐regular labor, while affecting directly employed non‐regular labor in a positive linear way. Thirdly, labor unions in large establishments are more active and influential in representing their members' interests than their counterparts in small establishments with limited financial resources. In particular, the interactive function of the union's power and union leaders' attitudinal inclinations is found to be significant in the negative direction among large establishments.     

Broad‐Based Employee Stock Ownership: Motives and Outcomes

Firms initiating broad‐based employee share ownership plans often claim employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) increase productivity by improving employee incentives. Do they? Small ESOPs comprising less than 5% of shares, granted by firms with moderate employee size, increase the economic pie, benefiting both employees and shareholders. The effects are weaker when there are too many employees to mitigate free‐riding. Although some large ESOPs increase productivity and employee compensation, the average impacts are small because they are often implemented for nonincentive purposes such as conserving cash by substituting wages with employee shares or forming a worker‐management alliance to thwart takeover bids.