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61.
We show that vendor financing appears in equilibrium as the result of repeated trade interactions between a buyer and a supplier when changing supplier is costly. Competition between suppliers forces them to offer a rebate before the relationship is initiated and switching costs allow the buyer to borrow from the supplier in the first period and to roll over the debt until the end of the relationship. The sequence of transfers is similar to a long-term financing structure. Our model suggests that switching costs allow small business owners to smooth their dividend income by using vendor financing. 相似文献
62.
Damien Besancenot Karine Lamiraud Radu Vranceanu 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2023,32(2):400-423
The French market for specialist physician care has a dual legal structure: physicians must exclusively work in sector 1 and charge regulated fees or in sector 2, where they can freely set their fees. Patient out-of-pocket payments in sector 2 are partially covered by private insurance. The primary differentiating factor between both sectors is the number of patients per specialist, which in turn directly affects the overall quality of the service provided. We built an equilibrium model to analyze both specialists' decisions about which sector to work in, and patients' choice of physician and therefore sector. More specifically, the model allowed us to study the effect of changes in prices and economy-wide patient-to-specialist ratios on profits and patients' utility associated with the services provided in each sector. 相似文献