Food management in tourism: Reducing tourism’s carbon ‘foodprint’

Food production and consumption have a range of sustainability implications, including their contribution to global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). As some foodstuffs entail higher GHG emissions than others, managing their use in tourism-related contexts could make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation. This article reviews the carbon intensity of selected foods and discusses how foodservice providers could adapt their practices. It shows that even though food management could substantially reduce the GHG emissions of foodservice providers, its application is currently hampered by the complexity of food production chains and a lack of dependable data on the GHG intensity of foodstuffs. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a number of recommendations in respect of how foodservice providers can better purchase, prepare and present foods. Further research is now needed to refine and extend our understanding of the contribution that food management can make to reducing tourism’s carbon ‘foodprint’.     

Workaholism versus work engagement and job crafting: What is the role of self‐management strategies?

Job crafting refers to the proactive actions employees take to redesign their jobs in order to get a better fit with their competencies, expectations, and wishes. So far, little is known about job crafting's underlying mechanisms. In this study, we examine how two different states of affective well‐being (workaholism and work engagement) relate to job crafting 3 months later and how these well‐being states steer different self‐management behaviours, which ultimately lead to job crafting. Structural equation modelling on a heterogeneous sample (N = 287) revealed that work engagement and workaholism both relate to expansive job crafting through different self‐management strategies. Work engagement relates to challenge and resource seeking via self‐goal setting and self‐observation strategies, whereas workaholism associates with challenge and resource seeking only through self‐goal setting. In addition, the results show a strong relationship between workaholism and self‐punishment. Altogether, the findings suggest that self‐management strategies can function as an explanatory mechanism for different job crafting behaviours.     

Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure

In the recent past, there have been numerous scandals around poor product qualities in various industries. Although it can be easily rationalized why bad practices have not been reported by the inflictors themselves, it is more difficult to understand why the non‐inflicting competitors did not report their rivals' acts. In this paper, we study these competitors' incentives to acquire and to disclose information on the quality of their rivals' products and question when we can leave the information disclosure process to the competitive pressure of markets and when there is a need for governmental intervention. We find that low quality levels can be disclosed in markets that exhibit negative spill‐over effects, but should not be expected to be disclosed in markets that exhibit a positive spill‐over effect. A regulatory policy on quality testing and disclosure may be more effective in the latter type of market.     

Old and new problems in the estimation of national accounts in transiton economies1

The paper discusses the measurement and interpretation of real GDP in transition economies. It argues that the statistical offices in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the CIS should place emphasis in the years ahead on improving the mechanism by which estimates of output, consumption, investment and foreign trade are balanced to ensure compliance with standard accounting identities. Improvements to this ‘balancing mechanism’may substantially strengthen the reliability of national accounts data and would not necessarily require a major further financial outlay for the statistical offices. In its discussion of the interpretation of real GDP data, the paper demonstrates that the use of the measured change in output at constant prices as a proxy for the evolution of ‘social welfare’may be particularly problematic in the context of transition economies.     

The dynamic adjustment towards target capital structures of firms in transition economies*

We examine the capital structure dynamics of Central and Eastern European firms to get a better understanding of the quantitative and qualitative development of the financial systems in this region. The dynamic model used endogenizes the target leverage as well as the adjustment speed. It is applied to microeconomic data for ten countries. We find that during the transition process, firms generally increased their leverage, lowering the gap between the actual and the target leverage. Profitability and age are the most robust determinants of capital structure targets. Although banking system development has in general enabled firms to get closer to their leverage targets, information asymmetries between firms and banks are still relatively large. As a result, firms prefer internal finance above bank debt and adjust leverage only slowly.     

Truth,Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*

We have conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth‐telling and trust in sender–receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth‐telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions, and they are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non‐sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous, and the former shows a higher level of truth‐telling but lower material payoffs. Our experimental findings are consistent with logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who experience non‐monetary lying costs as senders and non‐monetary costs when being lied to as receivers, and the other consisting of payoff maximizers.     

Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation

This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria.