The high cost of accurate knowledge

Many business thinkers believe it's the role of senior managers to scan the external environment to monitor contingencies and constraints, and to use that precise knowledge to modify the company's strategy and design. As these thinkers see it, managers need accurate and abundant information to carry out that role. According to that logic, it makes sense to invest heavily in systems for collecting and organizing competitive information. Another school of pundits contends that, since today's complex information often isn't precise anyway, it's not worth going overboard with such investments. In other words, it's not the accuracy and abundance of information that should matter most to top executives--rather, it's how that information is interpreted. After all, the role of senior managers isn't just to make decisions; it's to set direction and motivate others in the face of ambiguities and conflicting demands. Top executives must interpret information and communicate those interpretations--they must manage meaning more than they must manage information. So which of these competing views is the right one? Research conducted by academics Sutcliffe and Weber found that how accurate senior executives are about their competitive environments is indeed less important for strategy and corresponding organizational changes than the way in which they interpret information about their environments. Investments in shaping those interpretations, therefore, may create a more durable competitive advantage than investments in obtaining and organizing more information. And what kinds of interpretations are most closely linked with high performance? Their research suggests that high performers respond positively to opportunities, yet they aren't overconfident in their abilities to take advantage of those opportunities.     

Uncertainty in the transaction environment: an empirical test

Previous studies examining the relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration have produced a conflicting set of results. To clarify this puzzle we drew on the literature to conceptualize three distinct forms of uncertainty—primary, competitive, and supplier—and hypothesized that each had a different effect on vertical integration. The hypotheses were tested using experimental data collected from 308 managers. Consistent with our prediction of differential effects, we found that primary and competitive uncertainty were negatively associated with the decision to vertically integrate, but supplier uncertainty was positively related to the vertical integration decision. No interaction effects were found. Implications for theory and research are suggested. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inkontinent durch Schwangerschaft

St?rungen der Beckenbodenfunktion - Das Thema bewegt viele Frauen. Und bei jeder Schwangerschaft wird die Frage nach dem Wunsch-Kaiserschnitt aufs Neue diskutiert. Doch wie gro? ist die Gefahr tats?chlich, durch eine Schwangerschaft und Geburt inkontinent zu werden. Und: Wozu k?nnten Sie Ihren Patientinnen raten?     

Measuring market response to regulation of the cable TV industry

During the 1988–1990 period, the cable television industry was subject to a number of regulatory events. These centered on possible reregulation of rates for basic service and reduction of entry barriers for potential competitors. Using the event study methodology on a portfolio of cable firms, we find evidence that news of no reregulation caused significant positive abnormal returns. News of reregulation caused insignificant negative abnormal returns. These findings provide some support for the traditional consumer protection theory of regulation. News related to entry barriers generally had no significant effect on returns, which suggests that elements of natural monopoly may exist in the industry.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.