Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?

I examine the (lack of) economic logic that underlies the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s latest iteration of network neutrality regulations. I explore potential unintended consequences and find a substantial tension between the regulations and the objective of promoting consumer choice and sovereignty. I also identify market developments that could largely neutralize the regulations unless they are expanded to constrain Internet access providers’ actions further.     

Information and the hold‐up problem

We examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input. We study how the resulting hold‐up problem is affected by the seller's information about the investing party's likely returns from its investment. Our principal focus is on the effects of the investment's being observable by the noninvesting party. We establish conditions under which the seller's ability to observe the buyer's investment harms the seller, benefits the buyer, and reduces equilibrium investment and total surplus. We also note conditions under which investment and welfare rise when investment is observable.     

Perceived crisis management and its effect on re-election: the case of local government in Israel under the Second Lebanon War

The performance of local authority heads in times of emergency is a topic that has apparently received very little attention in the research literature. The same is true with regards to the relationship between performance and re-election chances in crisis situations. The hybrid macro polity view makes it possible to ‘pit’ the rational school of objective performance against the bounded rationality school of perceived performance. We examine which of the two is better at explaining the replacement or re-election of the incumbent local authority head in 17 local authorities in the North of Israel, after the Second Lebanon War. In the “Beauty Queen” contest between perceived and objective performance, the perceived performance appears to be a clear winner.     

High-involvement information sharing practices: an international perspective

The type of information shared within organizations is a key aspect of strategic human resources management. In this exploratory study, we expand our understanding of high-performance work systems (HPWSs) by examining the information sharing practices of firms operating in different countries to assess the extent that high-involvement-oriented information sharing in organizations is influenced by home-country economic structures and national cultural factors. We assess firm-level data from a 12-country sample to evaluate the use of formal information sharing practices for non-managerial employees. The results of our analysis support the contention that information sharing practices varies by country, and that cultural similarities based on geographical region exist within the three information content areas of business strategy, financial performance, and organization of work. Specifically, we found significant variance in information sharing practices of firms based in different countries but homogeneity of practices among geographical neighbors. There is a modest positive relationship between sharing business strategy information and perceived firm performance that is significantly stronger in North America compared to other regions. These results have important implications for the ongoing theoretical development of mechanisms underlying the use of HPWS practices in an international context.     

State contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts

Review of Accounting Studies - This paper examines the relation between state contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts. Contract theory suggests that balance sheet based...     

Privatization: Choosing the Optimal Time Path

We consider a government that wishes to choose the optimal time path of privatization. The government is concerned with maximizing output over some specified period while taking into account (1) the level of unemployment that will be attained as the end of that period, (2) the improvement in labor productivity of workers in the nationalized enterprises as a consequence of growing competition from privatized firms, and (3) the reemployment rate of the redundant workers displaced as their firms become privatized. We present a model exhibiting these features and derive the optimal policy that characterizes the rate of privatization within the period. When all of the elements noted above are present, we show it is never optimal to privatize instantaneously. We also show the relationship of the optimal rate of transition to the underlying objectives of the government. J. Comp. Econom., December 1993, 17(4), pp. 715-736. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012.     

Product availabilty as a strategic variable: The implications of regulating retailer stockouts

We study product availability as a strategic variable in a sequential game between consumers and a monopolist. We use a perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to solve the game under different regulatory regimes. We show that under certain assumptions about the regulatory environment, a two-price equilibrium in which the quantity of the lower-priced good is limited may exist even when a single retailer sells two brands that are perfect substitutes. The FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising are shown to be potentially welfare enhancing as they facilitate commitment on the part of a monopolist credibly to plan for stockouts. Paradoxically, our analysis suggests that the more stringent FTC regulation prohibiting stockouts by retail food stores from 1971 to 1988 was Pareto worsening, as it removed the monopolist's commitment mechanism.