Privacy, property rights and efficiency: The economics of privacy as secrecy

There is a long history of governmental efforts to protect personal privacy and strong debates about the merits of such policies. A central element of privacy is the ability to control the dissemination of personally identifiable data to private parties. Posner, Stigler, and others have argued that privacy comes at the expense of allocative efficiency. Others have argued that privacy issues are readily resolved by proper allocation of property rights to control information. Our principal findings challenge both views. We find: (a) privacy can be efficient even when there is no “taste” for privacy per se, and (b) to be effective, a privacy policy may need to ban information transmission or use rather than simply assign individuals control rights to their personally identifiable data.

Born-International SMEs: BI-Level Impacts of Resources and Intentions

The Katz and Gartner (1988) model describes four central properties of emerging organizations: resources, intention, exchange, and boundary. While designed as a general model for organizations, the approach has the potential to explain the early lives of "born-international" firms. In this study, boundary is used to define the central sampling frame. Two other properties, resources and intention, are evaluated in terms of their impact on the fourth property: exchange, measured as a firm's export growth and intensity. Given the inherent presence of two levels of analysis in emerging organizations, intention and resources are evaluated at both the individual and the organizational level. A sample (N = 47) of young "born-international" firms in the Indian software industry was studied, using a questionnaire. Results of the analysis are mixed for resources at both the individual and firm level variables. Intention is significant at the individual level but not the firm level. Contrary to other studies, these findings suggest that during the early stages of firm development, owner, not firm, characteristics play a pivotal role in performance, especially exports. The speculation is that this occurs because, in early stages, firms are relatively disorganized relative to the owner.     

On education,screening and human capital

The paper tests the hypothesis that educational attainment acts, inter alia, as a screening device for worker selection by comparing the average educational level of pairs of screened and non-screened groups within similar occupational categories. The results, based on Israeli data, support the view that strong screening effects are at work.     

Labor migration and risk aversion in less developed countries

"In this paper we question the pioneering work of Todaro, which states that rural-to-urban labor migration in less developed countries (LDCs) is an individual response to a higher urban expected income. We demonstrate that rural-to-urban labor migration is perfectly rational even if urban expected income is lower than rural income. We achieve this under a set of fairly stringent conditions: an individual decision-making entity, a one-period planning horizon, and global risk aversion. We obtain the result that a small chance of reaping a high reward is sufficient to trigger rural-to-urban labor migration."     

Equally Weighted Portfolios of Randomly Selected Stocks and the Individual Investor

The article contrasts 500 randomly formed equally weighted portfolios (1/N) to 221 actively managed stock funds, individual stocks, and the IBrX-50 index, representing indexed stock funds, considering transaction costs. The sample are the 50 stocks in IBrX-50 index in January 2007 throughout 60 months. Investors are likely to achieve greater returns and return-to-risk ratios with a randomly formed 1/N portfolio than with a stock fund, particularly those targeting retail investors, or one of the 50 stocks also randomly drawn. These portfolios would also outperform the IBrX-50. Robustness tests with variations in size and frequency of rebalancing do not change conclusions.     

Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Two‐Sided Benefits

Both senders and receivers derive benefits from telecommunications messages. Hence, consumers’ sending and receiving decisions generate external effects. We explore whether intercarrier compensation (i.e., an access charge) can induce carriers to set retail prices that internalize these external effects. We find that an access charge can induce constrained‐efficient sending and receiving prices for exchanging messages across networks, taking the sum of these prices as given, but cannot induce the correct sum. We also show that the internalizing role for the access charge can imply a nonzero access charge is efficient even in highly symmetrical situations, and that the efficient access charge may be positive or negative.     

Efficient division of profits from complementary innovations

Many products—including microprocessors, telecommunications devices, computer software, and on-line auction services—make use of multiple technologies, each of which is essential to make or sell the product. The owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies. We show that, despite this externality, the structure of payoffs that support efficient R&D investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations. The paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect R&D investment in complementary technologies. The results have policy implications for the organization of R&D, the assessment of damages for patent infringement, and allocations of value in patent pools.     

The demand for liquid assets and involvement in exports; some empirical results

The hypothesis that the greater a firm's involvement in exports, the greater will be that firm's demand for liquid assets, is empirically tested in this paper. The results are supportive of the hypothesis. In addition it was found that firms owned by labor cooperatives have lower demand for liquid assets than other firms.