Promising politicians,rational voters,and election outcomes

Overwhelming anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians often promise more during an election campaign than they are willing or able to deliver once elected. In this paper, we present two signaling models to explain this phenomenon. In the first model, two candidates maximize their share of the vote. In the second model both try to convince the median voter. In each model, candidates rationally distort their true policy position. Voters, however, are not fooled. Upon observing election promises, they can rationally infer the true position of each candidate. Hence, the election outcome is not affected.JEL Classification: D72, D82The author thanks Peter Kooreman, Wilko Letterie, Bert Schoonbeek, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

Summary. We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains.Received: 22 April 2002, Revised: 17 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D63, D71, D82.I am very grateful to Naoki Yoshihara for useful discussions and suggestions that motivate me to study this subject. I would also like to thank Kotaro Suzumura, Koichi Tadenuma, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, and the editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments.     

The Comparison between Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes under Monopolistic Competition

This paper shows that the welfare dominance of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition, extends to a Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition framework with differentiated products, increasing returns to scale, entry/exit and love of variety. This result is obtained, even though ad valorem taxation leads to increased firm exit compared to the equal-yield unit tax. Yet the smaller tax over-shift, occurring under ad valorem taxation, more than compensates this disadvantage.Acknowledgement Comments and suggestions from Anthony Atkinson, Jürgen Bitzer, Rainald Borck, David Collie, Jan G. Jørgensen and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.     

Testing of Unit Root Cycles in the Swedish Economy

In this article we examine the existence of unit root cycles in 11 long Swedish macroeconomic time series. We use a version of the tests of Robinson (1994) that permits us to test this type of hypothesis, which is based on the Gegenbauer processes. The results show that, for most of the series, the unit root cycles occur approximately every six periods. However, in case of the GDP deflator and wage rates, first differences may be required before proceeding to the analysis of the cyclical structure.JEL code: C22     

Work Incentives and Labor Supply Effects of the ‘Mini-Jobs Reform’ in Germany

We analyze the work incentives and labor supply effects of the so-called mini-jobs reform (subsidies of social security contributions to people with low-earnings jobs) introduced in Germany in April 2003. The analysis is based on a structural labor supply model embedded in a detailed tax-benefit microsimulation model for which we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Our simulation results show that the likely employment effects of the mini-jobs reform will be small. The small positive participation effect is outweighed by a negative hours effect among already employed workers. The fiscal effects of the reform are also likely to be negative. We conclude that the analyzed mini-jobs reform is not an effective policy to increase employment of people with low earnings capacity.*We thank the German Science Foundation (DFG) for financial support under the research program Flexibilisierungspotenziale bei heterogenen Arbeitsmärkten (project STE 681/5-1).     

Economic implications of better information in a dynamic framework

Summary. We consider an OLG model with accumulation in human capital and analyze the economic implications of information about individual skills. Agents in each period differ by the random innate ability assigned to each individual. When young, all agents are screened for their abilities and this screening process (signal) constitutes a public information which is used in choosing the level of private investment in education. We demonstrate that in the presence of risk sharing markets better information may be harmful for all in equilibrium, and find conditions under which better information either enhances growth or reduces growth.Received: 8 September 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D80, J24.Correspondence to: Bernhard EckwertWe are pleased to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of R. Benabou, Z. Eckstein, E. Helpman, B. Ravikumar and D. Tsiddon. Also, special thanks are given to two anonymous referees. This research was supported by a Grant from G.I.F., the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.     

Sophisticated play by idiosyncratic agents

Agents are drawn from a large population and matched to play a symmetric coordination game, the payoffs of which are perturbed by agent-specific heterogeneity. Individuals observe a (possibly sampled) history of play, which forms the initial hypothesis for an opponent's behaviour. Using this hypothesis as a starting point, the agents iteratively reason toward a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. When sampling is complete and the noise becomes vanishingly small, a single equilibrium is played almost all the time. A necessary and sufficient condition for selection, shown to be closely related (but not identical) to risk-dominance, is derived. When sampling is sufficiently incomplete, the risk-dominant equilibrium is played irrespective of the history observed.JEL Classification: C72, C73The authors thank Tom Norman, Kevin Roberts, Hyun Shin, Peyton Young, the editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Correspondence to: C. Wallace     

The pigeon breeders' cup: a selection on selection theory of economic evolution

Both the evolutionary literature in economics and the competitive advantage literature in business strategy point to the importance of a firm's replication/selection mechanisms in developing and sustaining inimitable organization capabilities, competencies, competitive advantage and economic rents. This mechanism can be conceived of as a hierarchy of organization processes where primary, added-value processes are nested within control processes, which are nested within deployment processes, that are nested within learning processes. The evolution of this organization of processes and their complementary assets along the added-value chain within the firm and among firms is the result of the legacy of the past process-thinking skills of the firms in the added-value chain and their present thinking skills. Served and factor markets select on the dynamic effects and products of these processes and, hence, ultimately on the phenomenon that create the processes (process thinking). This selection on selection (SoS) theory is used to explain Schumpeterian ?creative destruction? at a new level of analysis, extend the satisficing principle, and identify a new stream of potentially promising empirical research.JEL Classification: A1, B31, B52, D21, M1Comments by Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Alan J. Malter, Paul W. Miniard, Paul W. Farris, and an anonymous reviewer on earlier drafts of this paper are gratefully acknowledged. The editing of Kathryn Morris is also appreciated.     

Modelling the Stochastic Component of Behaviour in Experiments: Some Issues for the Interpretation of Data

This paper considers some of the questions raised by the fact that people's behaviour—including their behaviour in experimental environments—has a stochastic component. The nature of this component may be crucial to the interpretation of the patterns of data we observe and the choice of statistical criteria for favouring one hypothesis at the expense of others. However, it is arguable that insufficient consideration has been given to the way(s) in which the stochastic element is modelled. The paper aims to explore some of the issues involved. JEL Classification: C12, C73, C91