Completion deadlines,adaptive learning assignments,and student performance

The authors examine effects on student performance, from applying different deadline strategies to online assignments in face-to-face principles of macroeconomics courses. Students in one section were required to complete weekly adaptive learning assignments. Students in the second section were required to complete the adaptive assignments only before each of the three exams administered in the course, thereby giving students more control over when to complete them. The findings show that the presence of rigid deadlines detracted from student participation with the adaptive learning assignments. However, the assignments contributed positively to performance in the traditional assessment categories of homework and exams.     

Adam Smith on lotteries: an interpretation and formal restatement

The paper concerns a neglected aspect of the Wealth of Nations (with the notable exception of D. Levy 1999 Levy, D. M. 1999. “Adam Smith’s Katallactic Model of Gambling: Approbation from the Spectator.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 21 (1): 81–91. doi:10.1017/S1053837200002868.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), dealing directly with decision under risk. In a few pages from book I, chapter 10, Adam Smith explicitly named “lotteries” various objects of choice (possible occupations, or investment opportunities, for instance) and provided an analysis which standard expected utility glasses would hardly fit. Taking this into account allows a better understanding of the part played by typical characters like the “projector” or the “sober man”, in such matters as Smith’s conception of entrepreneurship or of the credit market. The use of some modern concepts in decision analysis (inverse stochastic dominance, rank dependent utility, prudence toward risk), is a means to show the existence, in Smith’s work, of an original theory from decision under risk, where his analysis of lotteries in the Wealth of Nations is consistent with statements from his moral philosophy on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses and to the regulating part played by the impartial spectator.     

The Persistence of IPO Mispricing and the Predictive Power of Flipping

This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first-day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first-day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first-day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are "extra-hot" IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders "flip" IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.     

Consideration of the social context of auditors’ reliance on expert system output during evaluation of loan loss reserves

Auditors are accountable for judgments made within the social context of the accounting firm. Tetlock (1985) states that decision makers often use the acceptability heuristic to cope with accountability. According to this heuristic, individuals make decisions which they are reasonably confident will be acceptable by others to whom they are accountable. When auditors form judgments with the aid of expert system output, they must determine the appropriate level of reliance on the expert system output. Since the expert system output is based on the input of experts, auditors may decide the output is ‘acceptable‘ and overrely on the output. In addition, because of the conservative nature of the accounting firm, expert system output which is negative may be viewed as more acceptable than positive output leading to greater overreliance. The results indicate that auditors do overrely on expert system output and rely to a greater degree on output which is negative versus output which is positive. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paradigm Shifts in Economic Theory and Policy

In most countries, mainstream economic policy has not yet undergone any significant change, and there is little consensus on what, if anything, ought to replace it. However, there are some signs of an emerging transition, at several levels.     

Multilevel Information Presentation Strategy and Customer Reaction: An Empirical Investigation in an Online Setting

This study investigates the use of polyinstantiated information in management of customer relationships. Polyinstantiation can be used to present different information to different customers who are segmented according to some criterion, such as prior purchase behavior. An empirical study shows that presentation of multilevel benefits information affects customer satisfaction with the offer and information quality which, in turn, affect the overall Web satisfaction. This effect is independent of and comparable in size to the effect of customer prior attitude toward the Web and the Internet. Although the present study employs a Web-based retail setting, the relationships between this information presentation approach and measures of user/consumer satisfaction need not be limited to retail scenarios or to online interactions. We discuss the applicability of this technique of information control to different types of interactions between organizations and their constituents.     

Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior

Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum bargaining stage.