The growing role of informal controls: does organization learning empower or subjugate workers?

Several management theorists have called for organizations to incorporate organization learning, empowerment, open-book management, and similar initiatives to generate better value from an important strategic resource: employees. What does this mean for the controlled? Do extensions of the management control system’s ability to implement the strategy of the firm offer workers a more central role in creating their future? Or is this “progress\" just another means to extract extra effort from workers for the benefit of owners? This paper is developed in two parts. The first argues that seeking better value from workers is here to stay, and that the implications for management control system bear consideration. In particular, the five disciplines of Senge’s (1990) Organization Learning are introduced to illustrate growing ways informal controls enhance workers’ knowledge contributions. The second half of the paper examines implications of this increasing control. Some argue that it is naive to expect organization learning will lead managers to willingly realign existing lopsided rewards. However, as a natural response to change, these controls are themselves dynamic and evolutionary. This paper suggests that the growing dependence on employee’s superior knowledge recalibrates power arrangements. Further there is a growing awareness that many managers’ self-interest is mitigated by their sense of fairness. Consequently, an increasingly shared authority combined with the self-reflection and transparency of organization learning raises the possibility of an environment where those who perform the work share more equally in its rewards.     

Economic Growth and Longevity Risk with Adverse Selection

We study the implications of adverse selection in annuity markets in a general-equilibrium model of the closed economy. Agents differ in their health type and invest their assets in the annuity market. Without informational asymmetries each agent would obtain an actuarially fair insurance. If the individual health types and total annuity purchases are unobservable to the annuity firms then there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all agents annuitize at a common rate. At this pooling rate unhealthy agents would eventually like to borrow but this would reveal their true health type. As a consequence, they rationally drop out of the market. Surprisingly, the welfare and growth effects of the informational asymmetries are rather small.     

Why do firms switch underwriters?

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.     

On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases

Little is known about the timing and execution of open marketrepurchases. U.S. firms are under no obligation to disclosewhen they are trading, and generally report only quarterly changesin shares outstanding. We use 64 firms' supplementally disclosedrepurchase trading data to provide the first examination ofrepurchase timing and execution. Across the days reported inour sample, firms adopted a variety of execution styles rangingfrom immediate intense repurchasing to delayed and smoothedrepurchasing. We find no clear evidence that repurchases aretimed to coincide with, precede, or follow, days on which informationis released. We benchmark the costs and value of a given repurchaseprogram against naive accumulation strategies achieving thesame terminal portfolio. While there is considerable variationacross the firms, NYSE firms on average beat their benchmarks,whereas NASDAQ firms do not. Finally, we document the liquidityimpact of open market repurchases. We find that repurchasingcontributes to market liquidity by narrowing bid-ask spreadsand attenuating the price impact of order imbalances on dayswhen repurchase trades are completed.