Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITIQUE OF ARGYRIS AND SCHON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATION THEORY AND INTERVENTION

The purpose of this essay is to examine psychoanalytically Argyris and Schon's contributions to organization theory and intervention. The author focuses his attention on the problem of individual and organizational resistance to change in the light of Argyris and Schon's cognitive psychological assumptions about learning, reasoning, and effectiveness.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

An exploratory study of exclusive dealing in channel relationships

The channel literature has paid little attention to issues related to exclusive dealing governance arrangements. Consequently, there is only limited knowledge about how exclusive dealing impacts various channel processes and outcomes. This gap is especially regrettable since exclusive dealing, in addition to being one of the most commonplace governance formats within the distribution channels, is also one of the best exemplars of viable unilateral governance formats. In this initial investigation, the authors explore the linkages among the constructs of exclusive dealing, relationalism, communication, and performance. Empirical data for the study were drawn from the photocopier industry. He obtained his M.B.A. and D.B.A. degrees from Boston University. His primary research interest includes channels of distribution, franchisor-franchisee relationships, and consumer purchase behavior in international contexts. He has published articles inJournal of Marketing Channels and the proceedings of several marketing conferences. This article was crafted when Rajiv Dant was at Boston University. He received his M.B.A. from Bombay University and his Ph.D. from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. His research focuses on channels of distribution, with primary emphasis on franchise structure, franchisee-franchisor relationships, and public policy aspects of franchising growth and ownership topics. His research has been published inJournal of Marketing, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Research in Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of the Operations Research Society, Marketing Letters, Journal of Small Business Management, Journal of Economic Psychology, Southern Business & Economics Journal, Philosophical and Radical Thought in Marketing, Journal of Healthcare Marketing, Journal of Marketing Channels, andInternational Small Business Journal.     

Free cash flow, debt-monitoring and managers' LIFO/FIFO policy choice

This paper explores the explanatory power of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis in managers' choice of LIFO versus FIFO. The association between FCF, and choice of inventory methods is based on the assumption that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when LIFO is the tax minimization method and that non-value-maximizing managers of firms with the FCF problem have incentives to choose FIFO, an income increasing method, in order to increase their compensation. However, since debt can act as a monitoring device and mitigate the agency problems of FCF, managers of firms with high FCF and high debt are less likely to choose FIFO than managers of firms with high FCF and low debt. The evidence is consistent with this expectation.