Multinational Learning under Asymmetric Information

The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational that the demand is low. The multinational reduces its output in the foreign market in order to signal-jam. In addition, the multinational increases its production in the other market. However, total production of the multinational is lower. Implications for research and development expenditure by the multinational are examined.     

The long-term unemployed,informal economic activity and the ‘underclass’ in Belfast: rejecting or reinstating the work ethic

The notion of an ‘underclass’ existing outside the realm of mainstream society continues to hold sway among journalists and policy-makers. While there are many new contenders for inclusion among the underclass, one of the most enduring group of participants is the long-term unemployed. Work-shy individuals, seemingly content to live on welfare benefits, are regarded as placing themselves outside the boundaries of mainstream economic and social life and passing a host of negative characteristics on to their children. The possibility that some of this group might defraud the welfare benefit system through working while claiming benefits adds further weight to negative images about the characteristics of ‘underclass’ members. The aim of this paper is to challenge some of these common assumptions by examining the ways in which unemployed people in an economically depressed locality in West Belfast relied on informal economic activity to help meet their material needs. Such activity has implications for the underclass debate because, rather than demonstrating commitment to some alternative set of values, informal economic activity drew participants into the wider economy and demonstrated adherence to mainstream values. Moreover, often the debate on social security abuse focuses on the supply side of the issue and is remarkably silent about the demand side of the equation. ‘Doing-the-double’ (working while claiming benefits) was not simply an individual response to unemployment and inadequate welfare benefits but was linked to changes in the labour needs of employers in the wider economy.     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

Two Types of Disagreement in Group Discussions of Japanese Undergraduates

In this study we investigated the nature of disagreement, which is a necessary component of a good discussion. We obtained 27 group discussion scenes by Japanese undergraduates that were evaluated by two ways: impression rating and ranking. As a result of factor analysis for the impression rating data, five factors were extracted: activeness, multidirection and unification of discussion, relationships of participants, development and sophistication of discussion, and sincerity of the participants, and each factor scores of each scene was simultaneously calculated. Each scene’s rank score was also calculated by relative comparisons. A significant positive correlation was found between the mean factor and the rank scores except for Factor 3 (relationships of participants). To consider the reason for the difference relating to Factor 3’s score, we scrutinized the discussion process of four scenes of the different patterns of the factor and rank scores. From the analysis of conversations, we suggested that this difference reflected ways of disagreement. By introducing a probative discourse tags for discussion (pDTD), we reasoned that the frequency of disagreement made Factor 3’s score negative and the absence of the second part of adjacency pairs made the rank score worse. The explicit speech and actions of blame such as emotional and aggressive expression, and neglect of treatment for the minor opinion made also the discussion unfair, but we think that these behaviors might erupt from the ground made by the accumulated implicit behaviors such as the absence of the second part. We finally concluded that the criticism type of disagreement increased the rank scores, and its censure type produced lower results, and the proper ways of disagreement in group discussions were discussed.     

On the performance of tests by Wu and by Hausman for detecting the ordinary least squares bias problem

We first consider the performance of the Wu (1973) - Hausman (1978) (W-H) specification error test as a test for the existence of ordinary least squares (OLS) bias. We discuss power properties of the test under alternative null hypotheses, one of which has not previously been considered. We next consider how the W-H test performs as an indicator of the extent (rather than the existence) of an OLS bias problem, since this usage of the test seems common in applied studies. Finally Monte Carlo methods are used to evaluate Wu's two-step estimation procedure involving the W-H test as a pretest.     

ON THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE SUPERVISORY GOODWILL CONTROVERSY

We provide evidence on the potential wealth effects of the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision that the U.S. government had violated contractual obligations when, in 1989, it passed legislation prohibiting savings and loan associations from counting “supervisory goodwill” as capital. The Supreme Court decision produced large wealth gains for the savings and loan plaintiffs, as did prior court decisions in favor of these savings and loans. However, little evidence exists to suggest negative market responses to important events surrounding the 1989 legislation.     

Currency devaluation and the Cooper paradox in the open-economy macro-disequilibrium model

Zusammenfassung Abwertung und das Cooper-Paradox im Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht. - In diesem Aufsatz wird das Cooper-Paradox im Rahmen eines IS-LM-BT-Ungleichgewichtsmodells überprüft. Die Analyse wird dadurch angereichert, da der monet?re “spillover”-Effekt einer Abwertung integriert wird in das Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht, in dem unechter Handel zum Ungleichgewichtspreis stattfinden kann. So k?nnen sich die “spillover”-Effekte in der gesamten Volkswirtschaft über die Marktverflechtung verbreiten. Es wird gezeigt, da\ unabh?ngig von der Marshall-Lerner Bedingung die heimische Volkswirtschaft schrumpfen wird, obwohl die Abwertung die Handelsbilanz verbessert (Cooper-Paradox). Au\erdem wird gezeigt, da\ dann, wenn die Marshall-Lerner-Bedingung erfüllt ist, die Abwertung sowohl zu einer Verschlechterung der Handelsbilanz als auch zu einer Expansion der heimischen Volkswirtschaft führen kann. Dieses Ergebnis widerspricht dem, was Cooper in den Entwicklungl?ndern mit einer Abwertung beobachtet hat.

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Resumen Devaluación monetaria y la paradoja de Cooper en un modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta. - En este trabajo se estudia la paradoja de Cooper dentro del contexto de un modelo IS-LM-BT de desequilibrio de ?spillover? separable. Se enriquece el análisis mediante la integración del efecto ?spillover? monetario de una devaluación al modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta, en el cual se permite el comercio a precio de desequilibrio; el efecto ?spillover? resultante se propaga a toda la economía atraves de los eslabonamientos entre los mercados. Se demuestra que la economía nacional se contrae, a pesar de que la devaluatión favorece al balance comercial (paradoja de Cooper), independientemente de que se satisfaga o no la condición de Marshall y Lerner. Asimismo, se muestra que si se satisface la condición de Marshall y Lerner la devaluación puede dar lugar tanto a una deteriorización del balance comercial como a una expansión de la economía national. Este resultado contrasta con lo observado por Cooper en países en desarrollo que han devaluado.

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Résumé Dévaluation et le Cooper-paradoxe dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte. - Dans cet article l’auteur examine le paradoxe de Cooper en cadre d’un modèle IE-LM-BT. L’analyse est enrichie par l’intégration de l’effet monétaire ?spillover? d’une dévaluation dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte dans lequel le commerce faux peut se passer en prix déséquilibre. C’est pourquoi les effets de ?spillover? peuvent propager dans l’économie entière par les relations d’intermarché. Il est démontré qu’indépendant de la condition de Marshall-Lerner l’économie locale se contracte même si la dévaluation améliore la balance commerciale (le paradoxe de Cooper). Il est aussi démontré que si la condition de Marshall-Lerner est satisfaite une dévaluation peut détériorer la balance commerciale et stimuler l’économie locale en même temps. Ce résultat est contraire à l’expérience de Cooper qui a observé les pays en voie de développement qui dévaluaient leurs monnaies.

     

Business Groups and the Big Push: Meiji Japan's Mass Privatization and Subsequent Growth

Paul Rosenstein-Rodan argues that economic development requirescoordinated investment in many interdependent industries, andprescribes a flood of state-controlled investment across allsectors—a so-called big push. Widespread government failuredefeated twentieth-century ‘big push’ schemes. Butspillovers across firms and industries, and from public goods,hold-up problems, and capital market limitations are real, andjustify coordinated growth across sectors if it can be donewithout government failures. Large, extensively diversifiedpyramidal business groups of listed firms dominate the historiesof developed economies and the economies of developing economies.Arguing that such groups provided this coordination in prewarJapan after a state-run big push failed, we propose that pyramidalbusiness groups are private-sector mechanisms for coordinatingbig push growth, and that competition between rival groups inducesefficiency unattainable in a state-run big push. We postulatethat a successful business-group led big push requires economicopenness, basic public goods, rule of law, separation of thestate from business, and a timely demise of business groupswhen the big push phase is complete. Where these criteria arenot met, growth stalls and oligarchic families become too powerfulto dislodge.