Explaining forecasting bias: The case of real exchange rate variance

Recent tests of the rational expections hypothesis (REH), based on the assumption that agents are risk-neutral, have yielded conflicting results when applied to foreign exchange markets. Here a two-stage procedure which does not assumej risk-neutrality is derived from a model of a utility-maximizing importer who incurs an adjustment cost if he changes his import order. Although a short-run test (based on aggregate imports) leads to rejection of the REH in the majortity of cases, a longer-ren test (based on manchinery imports) is more favourable to the null huypthesis. The observed shot-run tendency to, in effect, ignore low levels of real exchange rate variation is found to be more likely when bilateral rates have remained relatively stable, when the importingj economy is relatively closed, or when governments have announced policies of intervention to stabilize bilateral rates.     

Technology transfers and industry closures

There has been a shift of manufacturing industries from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to emerging countries. In a competitive global economy increases in productivity in any country are generally welfare-enhancing. The established industrialized countries can suffer from the collapse of some industries, and from the associated increase in unemployment. We model this process and analyze the interactions between various rigidities that cause it, such as the minimum viable scale of an industry or the number of workers who lack the necessary skills to change jobs. When, under free trade, the technology transfer causes the manufacturing industry to collapse in the home country, it experiences a discrete drop in welfare and the price of the manufactured good rises sharply. Further transfers may reverse these results. The optimal level of protection is the minimum size required to operate. Conditions that make supporting an ailing industry worthwhile can be interpreted in several ways but the conclusion is inescapable: technology transfers fundamentally affect arguments for industry protection at home.     

Emotional intelligence and resilience as predictors of leadership in school administrators

This mixed‐method study of 48 P–12 school administrators across three southeastern states was done to begin investigation of the impact of nontraditional leadership factors. As evidenced by the results, there is a strong correlation between the factors of emotional intelligence and resilience and leadership success.     

Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model

In this paper, we extend the Jain-Mirman [Jain, N., & Mirman, L. (2000). Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals. Economic Theory, 16, 333–353, Jain, N., & Mirman, L. (2002). Effects of insider trading under different market structures. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42, 19–39] and the Daher-Mirman [Daher, W., & Mirman, L. (2006). Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46, 530–551, Daher, W., & Mirman, L. (2007). Market structure and insider trading. International Review of Economics and Finance, 16, 306–331] papers on competition, and postulate that the competition among the insiders in the financial market be Stackelberg. However, an owner high in the organizational hierarchy, who designs manager compensation mechanisms and chooses a manager to serve his purpose, should have information on the manager's reaction and act as a Stackelberg leader in the financial sector. We show that owner's profit can definitely enlarged while the manager's profits may decrease or increase depending on the variances in the two sectors, which are the exogenous parameters.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals

Summary. In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading in a Static, Kyle-type model. In our model the insider is also the manager of the firm. Hence the insider chooses both the amount of the real output to be produced and the amount of the stock of the firm to trade. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between financial decisions and real decisions. In particular, we examine how insider trading on the stock market affects the real output and price and how the real decision making affects the financial variables, such as the extent of insider trading, stock prices, and the stock pricing rule of the market maker. In the model, the market maker observes two correlated signals: the total order flow and the market price of the real good. We study the informativeness of the stock price and the effects on insider's profits. We also construct a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the insider and the firm. Finally, we generalize the pricing rule set up by a competitive market maker and analyze the comparative statics of the model. Received: October 3, 1999: revised version: December 1, 1999     

Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms?? move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.     

Estimating switching costs after introducing Fixed-Mobile Convergence in Japan

In this study, based on a conjoint-type survey analysis, the switching cost of several Japanese telecom services are empirically examined simultaneously, contingent on each carrier’s bundling strategies. The results suggest the following conclusions. The hierarchy of switching costs is mobile phone service, fixed phone service, ISP (Internet Service Provider), and broadband access service, in descending order. Even if the government prohibits the formerly state-owned monopoly NTT from forming alliances with other carriers, the legacy NTT group would still command more than half of the market share under FMC if each carrier adopts a pure bundling strategy. If mixed bundling emerges as the primary strategy in the FMC market, the resulting type of competition from the introduction of FMC does not stimulate competitive pricing.