Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

Contract modifications and the basis behavior of live cattle futures

The purpose of this study was to assess the basis behavior of the Live Cattle Futures contract at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) before and after the 1995 contract changes. Additionally, an alternative method of basis calculation utilizing weighted mean futures prices versus settlement futures prices was compared to determine which method provides a better representation of the basis level. Within a regression model with heteroskedascity error framework, we found that the level of nearby basis in the period after June 1995 has shifted lower and the average monthly open interest of net commercial long positions has substantially increased after the contract modifications. These empirical results are consistent with the notion that more long activity entered the market in response to the contract modifications. Additionally, an alternative (new) measure of basis calculation (cash price minus weighted mean futures price) produced similar results to two other commonly used measures. In conclusion, the 1995 contract changes have neither increased nor decreased the volatility of live cattle basis. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:557–590, 2004     

Bibliometric analysis of the Journal of Consumer Studies and Home Economics, 1977–1983

Two questions formed the structure for examining the formal communication among researchers using the Journal of Consumer Studies and Home Economics (JCSHE) The first question pertained to the interrelationship between the literature published and cited in JCSHE. The second asked what impact the literature published in JCSHE had on authors publishing in other journals. By performing Bradford analysis using the 1,160 journal references cited by authors of 210 articles in the first seven volumes of JCSHE, 26 core journals were identified. JCSHE was ranked second because it was cited 54 times in 37 articles by 29 authors. Through citation analysis 17 citing articles published in 12 journals other than JCSHE were found. Seven of these 17 citing articles were published in other home economics journals.     

COUNTERTRADE AS TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION

This paper analyzes countertrade as a special case of a customs union in which the countertrade agreement gives rise (as in customs union theory) to both trade-creating and trade-diverting effects. The net effects on welfare are ambiguous. A detailed case study from Egypt and brief examples from other countries illustrate the relevance of this interpretation .     

Temporary controls on capital inflows

During the past decade a number of countries imposed capital controls that had two distinguishing features: they were asymmetric, in that they were designed principally to discourage capital inflows, and they were temporary. This paper studies formally the consequences of these policies, calibrates their potential effectiveness, and assesses their welfare implications in an environment in which the level of capital inflows can be sub-optimal. In addition, motivated by the fact that these types of controls have often been left in place after the dissipation of the shock that lead to the controls being implemented, the paper evaluates the welfare cost of procrastination in removing these types of controls.