Developing an Information-Based Marketing Strategy for a Consumer Protection Agency: A Case Study

Consumer protection agencies can improve their responsiveness and productivity by gathering and using market information to develop social marketing programs. The authors propose a strategic model using consumer complaint data and examine its application in the design of an information system for the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection. Results obtained from this system are presented to illustrate how the analysis of complaint data can be used in formulating a consumer protection strategy.     

Oil Currency and the Dollar Standard: A Simple Analytical Model of an International Trade Currency

The U.S. dollar is the central reference currency for international trade pricing and the main invoicing currency for primary commodities. This paper links these two observations within a stylized theoretical framework, and shows how to obtain a quantitative estimate of the gain to the U.S. economy when the dollar is a reference currency. With dollar invoicing of primary commodities, U.S. firms bear less exchange rate risk than foreign firms. This asymmetry leads to a dollar standard in international goods pricing. We then derive a simple analytical formula to calculate the gains and find that they are extremely small.     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy

We consider the desirability of modifying a standard Taylor rule for interest rate policy to incorporate adjustments for measures of financial conditions. We consider the consequences of such adjustments for the way policy would respond to a variety of disturbances, using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with credit frictions developed in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a) . According to our model, an adjustment for variations in credit spreads can improve upon the standard Taylor rule, but the optimal size of adjustment depends on the source of the variation in credit spreads. A response to the quantity of credit is less likely to be helpful.     

The Community Reinvestment Act and Targeted Mortgage Lending

We analyze residential mortgage lending by banks in periods surrounding upgrades or downgrades in their ratings under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Empirical results indicate that upgraded banks had higher relative levels of lending than did downgraded banks prior to ratings changes. Additionally, both downgraded and upgraded banks increased lending following implementation of reforms to the CRA in the 1990s, which were intended to more closely align rating assessment with lending outcomes. Little support is provided, on the other hand, for a hypothesis that banks respond to downgrades by increasing lending (despite apparent incentives for them to do so).     

Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance

This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.     

Implicit Employment Contracts: The Limits of Management Reputation for Promoting Firm Productivity

Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating postproduction firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity, which depends on levels of owner investment and employee productive effort, when managers have an incentive to favor the owner's interests over those of the employee. Drawing on research in psychology and behavioral economics, we argue that reputation concerns can more effectively promote firm productivity when manager compensation is relatively insensitive to how much the owner is allocated after production occurs. Consistent with our predictions, we find that reputation concerns lead to greater firm productivity and higher payoffs for all firm members, but only when manager pay is relatively insensitive to the owner's ex post allocation. In addition to offering testable empirical implications, our theory and results are important because they can help explain why executive compensation is, in practice, surprisingly insensitive to owner returns.     

From Research to Policy: Lessons from Individual Development Accounts

There goes in the world a notion that the scholar should be a recluse, a valetudinarian…. As far as this is true of the studious classes, it is not just and wise. Action is with the scholar subordinate, but it is essential…. Without it, thought can never ripen into truth… (Ralph Waldo Emerson).     

Evaluating the Impact on Pharmacy Practices of a Law Requiring the Posting of Drug Prices

Posting price lists of most frequently purchased retail drugs under Section 4333 of the California Pharmaceutical Law offers consumers the opportunity to make more effective price comparisons. The same information also permits examination of the pricing structure of an entire local market, and it was just such an examination which was undertaken in the present study for 100 items on sale at 24 pharmacies in the northern region of the San Francisco Bay area. Wide price differentials were found to exist. Pharmacies charging higher prices were found to do so across their entire product line: the higher prices were not related to better service but primarily to monopolistic practices. It was also concluded that if posting has so far failed to bring about lower prices, it may be due to token compliance. The study examined computer simulation techniques for measuring the effectiveness of small, unsophisticated pharmaceutical price surveys, and the accuracy of such surveys was shown to be extremely high.     

Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds

Private equity funds are important to the economy, yet there is little analysis explaining their financial structure. In our model the financial structure minimizes agency conflicts between fund managers and investors. Relative to financing each deal separately, raising a fund where the manager receives a fraction of aggregate excess returns reduces incentives to make bad investments. Efficiency is further improved by requiring funds to also use deal-by-deal debt financing, which becomes unavailable in states where internal discipline fails. Private equity investment becomes highly sensitive to aggregate credit conditions and investments in bad states outperform investments in good states.