The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

Defensive strategies for managing satisfaction and loyalty in the service industry

The investment model is used to predict customer responses to defensive value-added and value-recovery strategies. The two strategies were manipulated under different competitive environments with airline services scenarios in a controlled experiment. Hypotheses were affirmed as value-added and value-recovery strategies influenced customer satisfaction and loyalty with varying sensitivities to the competitive environment and different mechanisms consistent with prediction derived from the investment model. Regardless of value-added strategy and competitive environment, value-recovery strategy strongly and positively influenced customer satisfaction, situational loyalty, and enduring loyalty. Value-added strategy also had a positive effect on customer satisfaction and loyalty, but these effects emerged primarily when a value-recovery strategy was already present, and under conditions of less intense competition. Satisfaction was found to mediate strategic effects on loyalty, with more pronounced effects observed for value-recovery strategy and situational loyalty. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Geldpolitik in verändertem umfeld

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters

We analyze contributor behavior when there are two types of voters: positioned voters, who care about the ideological positions of candidates, and swing voters, who care about only the leadership abilities of candidates. Campaign expenditures, which are funded by contributions, are assumed to influence voters' perceptions of a candidate's ability. We find that the number of swing voters may have unexpected consequences on equilibrium campaign contributions. In particular, total contributions may increase as the number of swing voters decreases.
Elections are won by doing two things: mobilizing your base and winning the independent swing voters.
(Karl Rove, campaign strategist for George W. Bush)     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung