Modeling and forecasting short‐term interest rates: The benefits of smooth regimes,macroeconomic variables,and bagging

In this paper we propose a smooth transition tree model for both the conditional mean and variance of the short‐term interest rate process. The estimation of such models is addressed and the asymptotic properties of the quasi‐maximum likelihood estimator are derived. Model specification is also discussed. When the model is applied to the US short‐term interest rate we find: (1) leading indicators for inflation and real activity are the most relevant predictors in characterizing the multiple regimes' structure; (2) the optimal model has three limiting regimes. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence of the power of the model in forecasting the first two conditional moments when it is used in connection with bootstrap aggregation (bagging). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

Housing, credit, and real activity cycles: Characteristics and comovement

This paper describes the characteristics and comovement of cycles in house prices, residential investment, credit, interest rates, and real activity in advanced economies during the past 25 years. Stylized facts and regularities are uncovered using a dynamic generalized factor model and spectral techniques. House price cycles are found to lead credit and real activity over the long term, while in the short to medium term the relationship varies across countries. Interest rates tend to lag other cycles at all time horizons. Although global factors are important, the US business cycle, housing cycle and interest rate cycle generally lead the respective cycles in other countries over all time horizons, while the US credit cycle leads mainly over the long term.     

A neural network demand system with heteroskedastic errors

In this paper we consider estimation of demand systems with flexible functional forms, allowing an error term with a general conditional heteroskedasticity function that depends on observed covariates, such as demographic variables. We propose a general model that can be estimated either by quasi-maximum likelihood (in the case of exogenous regressors) or generalized method of moments (GMM) if the covariates are endogenous. The specification proposed in the paper nests several demand functions in the literature and the results can be applied to the recently proposed Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand system of [Lewbel, A., Pendakur, K., 2008. Tricks with Hicks: The EASI implicit Marshallian demand system for unobserved heterogeneity and flexible Engel curves. American Economic Review (in press)]. Furthermore, flexible nonlinear expenditure elasticities can be estimated.     

Skilled labor, unskilled labor, and economic growth

We study a growth model in which workers with different skill levels are imperfect substitutes. We show that economies with high substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers have high levels of capital, output, and a high proportion of skilled workers.     

Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization

The proliferation of preferential trade liberalization overthe last 20 years has raised the question of whether it slowsmultilateral trade liberalization. Recent theoretical and empiricalevidence indicates that this is the case even for unilateralpreferences that developed countries provide to small and poorcountries, but there is no estimate of the resulting welfarecosts. This stumbling block effect can be avoided by replacingthe unilateral preferences with a fixed import subsidy, whichgenerates a Pareto improvement. More importantly, this paperpresents the first estimates of the welfare cost of preferentialliberalization as a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization.Recent estimates of the stumbling block effect of preferenceswith data for 170 countries and more than 5,000 products areused to calculate the welfare effects of the European Union,Japan, and the United States switching from unilateral preferencesfor least developed countries to an import subsidy scheme. Ina model with no dynamic gains to trade, the switch producesan annual net welfare gain for the 170 countries that adds about10 percent to the estimated trade liberalization gains in theDoha Round. It also generates gains for each group: the EuropeanUnion, Japan, and the United States ($2,934 million), leastdeveloped countries ($520 million), and the rest of the world($900 million).     

Sophisticated voting and gate-keeping in the supreme court

'Sophisticated voting' has a solid theoretical foundation, butscholars have raised serious questions about its empirical importancein real-world institutions. The U.S. Supreme Court is one institutionwhere sophisticated voting should be common, but, paradoxically,where scholarly consensus about its existence has yet to emerge.We develop and test a formal model of sophisticated voting onagenda setting in the Supreme Court. Using data on petitionsfor certiorari decided in October term 1982, we show that, aboveand beyond the usual forces in case selection, justices engagein sophisticated voting, defined as looking forward to the decisionon the merits and acting with that potential outcome in mind,and do so in a wide range of circumstances. In particular, wepresent strong evidence for sophisticated behavior, rangingfrom votes to deny a case one prefers to reverse to votes togrant cases one prefers to affirm. More importantly, sophisticatedvoting makes a substantial difference in the size and contentof the Court's plenary agenda.     

Ethical Standards in Advertising: A Worldwide Perspective

An empirical study indicates how close advertisers from all the continents have been from the natural law and other fundamental moral principles. In their professional activities, many advertisers assumed the philosophical relativism as the framework for fundamental concepts. The ethical problems have not been equated with objectivity and the realist approach is appointed as a solution.     

Overinvestment and fraud

We analyze the interactions between two managerial tasks: investing and revealing information. We assume that a manager can invest influencing the firm’s quality, then he reports this quality to investors. Whenever truthful reporting is not an equilibrium, the manager has incentives to overinvest relative to shareholders. Therefore, the potential for market manipulation is the key in understanding investment policy; it is the desire to manipulate prices that leads to inefficient investment. Also, more manipulation occurs when the manager is in control, so prices are less informative. Finally, we show that the manager is better off with an exogenous reporting policy.