The Corporate Ethical Virtues Scale: Factorial Invariance Across Organizational Samples

This study investigated the factorial validity of the 58-item Corporate Ethical Virtues scale (CEV; Kaptein, J Organ Behav 29(7):923–947, 2008). The major aim was to test the invariance of the factor structure across different organizational samples. The CEV scale was designed to measure eight corporate virtues: clarity, congruency of supervisors, congruency of senior management, feasibility, supportability, transparency, discussability, and sanctionability. The data (total N = 3,702) consisted of four organizational samples that are operated in the private and public sector. The results of confirmatory factor analyses supported the hypothesized eight-factor structure, as well as its alternative second-order factor structure, where high correlations between the first-order factors (virtues) were explained by a general CEV factor. These factor structures (including factor loadings) remained the same across samples, lending strong support for the group invariance assumption of the scale. Thus, the 58-item CEV scale was found to be a valid tool for measuring the aspect of ethical organizational culture in different organizations, and its use can be recommended for future research.     

Ethical Life Cycle of an Innovation

Product safety has always been one of the main problems in engineering ethics. At times it has been discussed as primarily a problem of engineering ethics. However the right to safety is one of the four fundamental consumer rights and so it is an important theme also in business ethics. At the same time the problem of product safety is inseparably connected with business effectiveness: how much can we spend on product safety without making our production unprofitable? Below we will present a possible treatment of the safety problem in teaching business ethics to post-graduate industrial engineering students – as we deal with the problem in Tallinn Technical University.     

Do industries matter?

This paper poses the question ‘Do Industries Matter?’ in order to shed light on what observation-based Industry Studies researchers can offer empirical economists using large-scale datasets. I argue that industries matter from three distinct perspectives. First, the methodological approach in Industry Studies adds value to economists' normal activity of testing and generating theory. Data collected using Industry Studies methods can lead to new ideas and theory-building. Second, industries matter as they provide an institutional and historical context in which to study firms and workers. Such context improves the interpretation of how and why different practices and institutions fit together in specific industries. Third, recognizing differences in what is meant by an industry improves our ability to interpret specific ‘industry dummies’ in regressions.     

Strategic Policy and Environmental Quality: Helping the Domestic Industry to Provide Credible Information

This paper shows that a country can improve an industry's competitiveness by requiring domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating. Competitiveness will improve because this regulation will help the domestic industry to provide credible information about the environmental quality of its production. The credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market, and in this way increase consumers' willingness to pay for domestic products. Even if the government has no preferences for environmental quality, it has incentives to regulate its cheaters in order to help the domestic industry to provide credible information and thereby improve competitiveness.     

Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods

The formation of social norms for voluntary contributions to a public good is analyzed in a game in which people have preferences for private consumption, a public good, and social approval. Each person chooses to be one of the two types: a contributor or a non‐contributor. Thereafter, each person meets people who can observe his type. A non‐contributor feels disapproval, whereas a contributor feels approval if he believes that a contributor observes his type. The game has two asymptotically stable states: one in which everybody is a contributor, and one in which nobody is a contributor. Governmental subsidization of the public good can move the society to the former state, whereas a governmental contribution to the public good can move the society to the latter. Indeed, this crowding in or crowding out prevails even after policy reversal.     

Issues in the Design of Facilitated Collaboration Processes

Groups often rely on the expertise of facilitators to support them in their collaboration processes. The design and preparation of a collaboration process is an important facilitation task. Although there is a significant body of knowledge about the effects of facilitation, there is a dearth of knowledge about the ways in which facilitators design collaboration processes. Increased understanding in this area will contribute to the effective design and use of collaboration support and to the development of collaboration process design support. The research reported in this paper explores the strategies and techniques facilitators use to design a collaboration process, and the aspects of this task they perceive as challenging. We present the results of a questionnaire among professional facilitators. We compare facilitators with different expertise levels to identify challenges in the design of collaboration processes. We discovered that although the activities performed and information used by novices is not very different from expert practices, their limited experience makes them less flexible. When the actual session brings surprises such as different outcomes or conflict, novices cannot easily adapt their designs to accommodate these.     

Why Do Managers Leave Their Organization? Investigating the Role of Ethical Organizational Culture in Managerial Turnover

This study contributes to the corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, and executive succession literature by examining the effect of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) on strategic leadership turnover. We theorize that firms’ CSiR increases the likelihood of executive turnover. We also investigate the nature of succession (non-voluntary or voluntary succession) and successor origin (internal candidate or external candidate) following CSiR. We further examine how the CSiR–CEO succession relationship is moderated by firm visibility to stakeholders and industry dynamism. Our results, based on a dataset of 248 U.S. public firms between 2001 and 2008, provide evidence that firms’ CSiR affects what is conventionally seen as primarily a market-driven decision on executive turnover, especially when firms operate in a more dynamic industry. Research contributions and implications are discussed.