Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases

A common view in retail electricity markets is that retailers discriminate based on consumers’ loyalty: loyal consumers pay more and switchers can (and do) select the cheapest offers) when they switch. The premium is colloquially known as a “loyalty tax” or “loyalty premium”. Reflecting this understanding Australia’s governments, regulators and consumer advocates have encouraged consumers to switch electricity retailers. Using a sample of 47,114 household electricity bills we test whether consumers that had switched in the previous 12 months (“switchers”) pay less than consumers who remained with their retailers (“remainers”) in the previous 12 months. We find that the annual bills of switchers are expected to be AU$48 (4%) lower than remainers and that the median switcher could reduce their bills by 21% by selecting the cheapest offer. Classifying retailers into tiers however provides some nuance to the main conclusion: the third tier of retailers (the new entrants with market shares of less than 3%) impose higher loyalty taxes than the other two tiers (incumbents and mid-sized retailers). The middle tier of retailers impose the lowest loyalty tax, and in fact for many consumers they may reward loyalty. These findings suggest that the loyalty tax is (typically) smaller than widely considered, it varies across tiers of retailers and even engaged consumers typically do not select the lowest priced offer. This raises the question of whether switchers are motivated by lower bills as well as other factors or whether the main challenge is search difficulties.

     

Self-employment,start-up incentives and political ideology

We find evidence that public start-up incentives promote self-employment. This public policy seems to affect more women than men.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Perceived Inequality

Perception of inequality is important for the analysis of individuals' motivations and decisions and for policy assessment. Despite the broad range of analytic gains that it grants, our knowledge about measurement and determinants of perception of inequality is still limited, since it is intrinsically unobservable, multidimensional, and essentially contested. Using a novel econometric approach, we study how observable individual characteristics affect the joint distribution of a set of indicators of perceived inequality in specific domains. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we shed light on the associations among these indicators and how they are affected by covariates. The approach also gives insights on some results in the literature on inequality. The role of many subjective indicators for the perception of inequality is re‐examined and examples of policy applications are reviewed. The importance of our empirical approach to the measurement of perceived inequality is, in so doing, reinforced.     

Simultaneous versus sequential knowledge transfer in an organization

This paper studies an organizational knowledge sharing process which requires costly “teaching” and “learning” efforts on the part of the sender and receiver, respectively. The process is a team problem in which the principal rewards successful sharing by optimally rewarding performance. In this setting we compare two modes of knowledge transfer with regard to efficiency. The first is sequential in which the sender precommits to teaching and the receiver acts as a follower. The second is simultaneous where each agent simultaneously exerts effort. A key result is that the sequential mode dominates when teaching and learning are complements, but the simultaneous mode dominates if teaching and learning are substitutes.     

Spatially Balanced Sampling: A Review and A Reappraisal

Spatially distributed data exhibit particular characteristics that should be considered when designing a survey of spatial units. Unfortunately, traditional sampling designs generally do not allow for spatial features, even though it is usually desirable to use information concerning spatial dependence in a sampling design. This paper reviews and compares some recently developed randomised spatial sampling procedures, using simple random sampling without replacement as a benchmark for comparison. The approach taken is design‐based and serves to corroborate intuitive arguments about the need to explicitly integrate spatial dependence into sampling survey theory. Some guidance for choosing an appropriate spatial sampling design is provided, and some empirical evidence for the gains from using these designs with spatial populations is presented, using two datasets as illustrations.     

Welfare and product testing by a regulated monopolist

This paper studies a monopoly firm with the ability to conduct costly pre-market testing of its product in order to predict how safe this product is to consume. While there are private incentives to test, the amount of testing effort supplied by a monopolist need not be optimal. In a model which allows for an imperfect system of liability, we characterize and compare the allocations of testing effort and output at the full social optimum, the pure monopoly solution, and the second-best regulated optimum wherein the regulator chooses testing effort and the monopolist chooses output and price.     

Cross-national invariance of the entrepreneurial orientation scale

This study utilizes data from 1279 SMEs spanning seven countries to assess the cross-national invariance of the Covin and Slevin entrepreneurial orientation scale. We first examine the psychometric properties of the scale across the full sample and each of the individual countries, identifying the optimal model for invariance testing. We then conduct a series of tests for invariance, utilizing the American sample as a reference in each. Study results highlight the optimality of a three-factor, six-item scale, and provide additional information regarding the level of measurement equivalence that exists between the U.S. and each of the other countries analyzed.