Spatial Metrics of the Technological Transfer: Analysis and Strategic Management

The Triple Helix thesis states that research laboratories and universities can play an enhanced role in innovation in increasingly knowledge-based societies. In fact the locus of industrial innovation is shifting towards networks focused on technological transfer from public research laboratories to firms. This scenario presents challenges for investigating the new behaviour of research laboratories and the measurement and evaluation of their scientific and technological activity. This study analyses how the variable 'space' affects an important activity carried out within these laboratories: the technological transfer. The purpose of this research is to: (1) construct indicators, called sensors, starting from the geographical neo-classical approach based on physical distance, for measuring and studying the spatial dynamics of technological transfer;(2) apply the metrics to case studies using data from three institutes of the Italian National Council of Research operating in an industrialised region in the north-west Italy. The sensors are useful for understanding the spatial behaviour both of the technological transfer process, and the strategy of research laboratories. Some management implications conclude the research.     

Inflation,interest and exchange rates in the transition1

Central and Eastern European economies have made extraordinary progress in their trade and exchange regimes. Surprisingly, instant convertibility was established for a great variety of exchange rate regimes. In spite of diversity, all these countries have followed a common pattern: severe initial undervaluation - the cost of speed and unrestricted trade - followed by rapid real revaluation and incipient protectionism. Since 1994 in many cases an embarrass de richesse has appeared: high capital inflows which are either inflationary or costly to sterilize. A major cause of these flows - or at any rate of the high cost of sterilization - is the presence of significant interest rate differentials higher than required to cover the risk of devaluation. These are the necessary consequence of a policy of positive real interest rates and of real revaluation from excessively undervalued exchange rates. Lower interest rates are recommended, both to stem financial capital inflows and to reduce the cost of their sterilization.     

Income taxation when markets are incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative spot price effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 58E17, 46N10, 93B29 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D52, H21, H24, H25     

Constrained inefficiency in GEI: A geometric argument

In this paper we use global analysis to study the welfare properties of general equilibrium economies with incomplete markets (GEI). Our main result is to show that constrained Pareto optimal equilibria are contained in a submanifold of the equilibrium set. This result is explicitly derived for economies with real assets and fixed aggregate resources, of which real numéraire assets are a special case. As a by product of our analysis, we propose an original global parametrization of the equilibrium set that generalizes to incomplete markets the classical one, first, proposed by Lange [Lange, O., 1942. The foundations of welfare economics. Econometrica 10, 215–228].     

A model of Chinese central government

Why was the Chinese State able to promote economic growth during the reform era, yet has been unable to do so over the previous 30 years? In this article, we focus on a specific aspect of the question, which will contribute to the development of a more comprehensive explanation: the specific institutional arrangement that may induce the autocratic government to adopt growth‐enhancing policies. We consider a standard political‐agency model (Besley, 2006) where the incumbent leader may or may not be congruent, and where, to maintain power, both leader types need the support of the selectorate, an elite group having a say in selecting the leader, as well as associated access to special privileges. Primarily, we find that in autocracies, without electoral discipline to restrain the opportunistic behaviour of a leader, the size of the selectorate should be intermediate; if it is too small, the selectorate is captured by the leader and has no disciplinary role, but if too big, the leader's incentives are diluted.     

Inequality and criminality revisited: further evidence from Brazil

The objective of this study is to shed light on the determinants of criminality rates in Brazil. A panel data model was estimated using Brazilian states’ data. Our main result suggests that income inequality plays an important role in the determination of the crime rate. Furthermore, there are evidence suggesting that both unemployment and urbanization rates are positively related to crime. Based on a GMM approach we find the existence of an “inertial effect” on criminality. Besides that, the GMM results show that public security spending is effective in reducing criminality rates. Contrary to the common wisdom, we could not find evidence that poverty increases violent crimes. Finally, we have evidence that income inequality Granger causes crime, but not the reverse.     

Expropriation risk and discounting

This paper focuses on time preference and individual measures of expropriation risk. We use survey data on Italian households and on the 50+ population in eleven European countries. The surveys provide measures of discount rate and proxies for expropriation due to criminal offenses. We show that impatience increases with expropriation risk.