Green marketing strategies: an examination of stakeholders and the opportunities they present

As green marketing strategies become increasingly more important to firms adhering to a triple-bottom line performance evaluation, the present research seeks to better understand the role of “green” as a marketing strategy. Through an integration of the marketing, management, and operations literatures, an investigative framework is generated that identifies the various stakeholders potentially impacted through the environmentally friendly efforts of a firm. Specifically, the inter-connected nature of the core business disciplines of marketing, management (both strategy and human resources), and operations are examined as controllable functions within an organization from which strategies can be enacted to affect a firm’s stakeholders. The prior research in these areas is examined to identify potential research opportunities in marketing while also offering a series of representative research questions that can help guide future research in marketing.     

ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE: VALUE AND RISK IN AN AGE OF ECOLOGY

Environmental issues are restructuring markets and redirecting capital flows throughout the world. An outline is provided of concerns facing the development of an environmentally responsible or ‘environmental finance’ perspective. It reviews the major ways in which organizations are responding to environmental threats and opportunities in the three major branches of finance — corporate finance, investments and financial institutions — highlighting in particular novel programs and initiatives. In the past, financial concerns have exacerbated the degradation of the natural environment; in the future, they probably hold the key to their preservation.     

企业融资需谨记10大原则

在过去的一年里,由于全球经济衰退的影响,风险投资人们都捂紧了钱袋,对企业而言获得融资变得更加困难.近日,DFJ Gotham Ven-tures公司投资人Mark Davis撰文提醒企业在筹资过程中应该遵循十大法则,这样能大大提高筹资成功率.     

The asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation: a panel threshold regression approach

Prior research shows that chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their earnings management. We re-examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach, which allows the effect of earnings management on the CEO compensation to change across the level of earnings management and CEO compensation. Our results show that the effect of CEOs’ discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation. In particular, for firms with moderate (inordinate) levels of earnings management and CEO compensation, earnings management is rewarded (penalized).