Do small shareholders count?

We hypothesize that age similarity among small shareholders acts as an implicit coordinating device for their actions and, thus, could represent an indirect source of corporate governance in firms with dispersed ownership. We test this hypothesis on a sample of Swedish firms during the 1995-2000 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that compared with shareholders of differing ages, same-age noncontrolling shareholders sell more aggressively following negative firm news; firms with more age-similar small shareholders are more profitable and command higher valuation; and an increase (decline) in a firm's small shareholder age similarity brings a significantly large increase (decline) in its stock price. The last effects are more pronounced in the absence of a controlling shareholder.     

The impact of local and external university knowledge on the creation of knowledge-intensive firms: evidence from the Italian case

This paper investigates how far in space university knowledge goes to breed the creation of knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs), depending on the nature (either codified or tacit) and quality of this knowledge. We consider the impact of knowledge codified in academic patents and scientific publications and tacit knowledge embodied in university graduates on KIF creation in Italian provinces in 2010, while distinguishing between local university knowledge created by universities located in the same province and external university knowledge created by universities located outside the province. Our econometric estimates indicate that the positive effects of scientific publications and university graduates are confined within the boundaries of the province in which universities are located. Conversely, the creation of new KIFs in a focal province is positively affected by both local and external university knowledge codified in academic patents, even though the positive effect of this external knowledge rapidly diminishes with geographic distance. Furthermore, the above effects are confined to high-quality universities; low-quality universities have little effect on KIF creation.     

Evaluation of cooperative research

This report looks at evaluation studies of a number of cooperative academic-industrfy research programmes in Europe, and suggests that indirect economic benefits should be taken into account as well as motives and goals of participating firms.     

The economic rate of return of infrastructures and regional policy in the European Union

This paper examines the results of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of 200 major investment projects co-financed in 1988–93 by the European Commission. The project database we have built is probably one of the few existing sets of comparable micro-data on the expected rates of return of public infrastructure and on the quality of CBA leading to its calculation. The database reveals a striking dispersion of expected rates of return around the average. Part of the large sample variance is probably a consequence more of inconsistencies in the actual implementation of CBA than of structural differences among the European Union's more economically backward regions. We offer a measurement of the quality of CBA and compare EU ex-ante data with World Bank ex-post data.     

The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007–2008

Using novel data on investors' bond portfolios, we study the contagion of the crisis from securitized bonds to corporate bonds. When securitized bonds became “toxic” in August 2007, mutual funds retained the now illiquid securitized bonds and sold corporate bonds. Funds with negative flows or high liquidity needs liquidated more than others. Yield spreads increased more for corporate bonds whose pre-crisis bondholders were more heavily exposed to securitized bonds, compared to same-issuer bonds held by unexposed investors. The findings suggest that liquidity-constrained investors with exposure to securitized bonds played a role in propagating the crisis from securitized to corporate bonds.     

Information flows within financial conglomerates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation

We study how information flows within financial conglomerates by analyzing the relations between mutual funds and banks that belong to the same financial group. We investigate the effect that the lending behavior of affiliated banks has on the portfolio choice of the mutual funds that are part of the same group. We show that funds (fund families) increase their stakes in the firms that borrow from their affiliated banks in the period following the deal by far greater amounts than other unaffiliated funds (fund families). We provide evidence that this strategy is information-driven. The performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing firms exceeds that of their other positions in nonborrowing stocks located in the same industry as well as that of other stocks having similar characteristics by up to 1.6% per month. Funds increase (decrease) their stock holdings in those borrowing stocks that subsequently provide positive (negative) abnormal returns, suggesting that they exploit privileged inside information not available to other market participants. This behavior is prevalent largely in funds located in close geographic proximity to their lending banks. Furthermore, it is exhibited mostly by young, small, and poorly performing fund families. Our evidence points to information flows within conglomerates through informal channels such as personal acquaintances.     

Multinationals without Advantages

We question the widespread argument that firms embarking on foreign direct investments must possess some specific advantages to offset the penalties of operating across national and cultural boundaries. A simple model shows that firms might invest abroad to capture local advantages through geographical proximity of plant location, rather than to exploit existing ones. Because of spatially bounded spillovers, laggard firms might use foreign investments to acquire location-specific knowledge, whereas leading firms might prefer costly exports to avoid the dissipation of their advantages.
JEL classification: F 23; O 32; L 22