Evidence of Stock Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume: A Threshold Quantile Regression Approach

This paper presents a capital asset pricing model‐based threshold quantile regression model with a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic specification to examine relations between excess stock returns and “abnormal trading volume”. We employ an adaptive Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method with asymmetric Laplace distribution to study six daily Dow Jones Industrial stocks. The proposed model captures asymmetric risk through market beta and volume coefficients, which change discretely between regimes. Moreover, they are driven by market information and various quantile levels. This study finds that abnormal volume has significantly negative effects on excess stock returns under low quantile levels; however, there are significantly positive effects under high quantile levels. The evidence indicates that each market beta varies with different quantile levels, capturing different states of market conditions.     

Learning by doing,spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers.JEL Classification: L11, L13, O31Correspondence to: Michael TroegeWe would like to thank Hans Mewis, Christophe Moussu and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of seminar participants at WZB, Humboldt University, Northwestern University and the EEA/ESEM 1999 meetings. Part of the research was carried out while Michael Tröge was visiting Northwestern University. Financial support by the German Research Council (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

THE SHORT‐RUN EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF RECENT MINIMUM WAGE CHANGES: EVIDENCE FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY

This paper presents early evidence on the employment effects of state minimum wage increases enacted between January 2013 and January 2015. As of 2015, we estimate that relatively large minimum wage increases (defined as those exceeding $1) reduced employment among low‐skilled population groups by just over 1 percentage point. Smaller minimum wage increases, as well as increases linked to inflation indexation provisions, appear to have had much smaller (and possibly positive) effects on employment over our sample period. The estimates thus raise the potential importance of nonlinearities in the minimum wage's effects, which are consistent with standard models of the labor market. (JEL H11, J08, J23)     

Agency Conflicts and Risk Management

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts andrisk management. In contrast to previous contributions, ouranalysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflictsbut also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that thecosts of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essentialin determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firmsthat derive more of their value from assets in place (lowermarket-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment,generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, theymay be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestmentincentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firmswith fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartramet al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictionsrelating the benefits associated with risk management to variousdimensions of the firm's economic environment.     

Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations

This paper analyzes a simple model of taxation in a federal system within which policymakers are revenue–maximizing Leviathans and fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, across the "states," but also vertically between levels of government. Such an economy is characterized by excessively high taxation in the noncooperative equilibrium. Intensifying horizontal competition, by increasing the number of states, unambiguously increases revenues (contrary to the Leviathan wisdom) but nevertheless enhances consumer welfare (consistent with the Leviathan wisdom). Revenue sharing arrangements between policymakers are shown to be—contrary to the Leviathan wisdom—Pareto improving.     

Disinflation,credibility and price inertia: A Danish exposition

This paper analyses the disinflationary policy pursued in Denmark since October 1982, focusing on the Phillips curve trade-off and the credibility of this disinflationary policy. The overall conclusion confirms no significant indication of the disinflationary policy being credible.     

Local Area Inequality and Worker Well-Being

This paper uses General Social Survey data linked to Census data to investigate the effect of local area income and income inequality on worker well-being. Others have found a robust negative correlation between reference group income and self-reported well-being. However, in many cases the reference group is defined as a large geographic area. This paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, it considers multiple nested geographic reference groups with US data. Second, it explicitly considers income inequality in addition to the level of income. It is found that both income and income inequality are positively associated with well-being at the census tract level, but negatively associated at the county level. Further, the effect of inequality on well-being decreases as income increases at the census tract and county level, while it increases at the state level.     

The efficiency of decentralized environmental policies under global pollution and tradable emission permits

We build a two asymmetric regions model with cross‐border pollution related to production. Each region issues emission permits and revenues from their sales finance public pollution abatement. The decentralized level of emission permits is efficient when permits are interregionally tradable and cross‐border pollution is perfect. This result is robust in a variety of cases—for example, when (i) capital is immobile or internationally mobile or only mobile between the two regions, and (ii) revenue from permits sales is transferred to a federal authority.     

Free Trade versus Autarky under Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi‐country world under Cournot competition with constant returns to scale and linear demand. We derive respective conditions under which free trade will hurt a country's consumers, benefit its firms, induce it to export, increase its output and raise its welfare. We show that these conditions are linked in a clear order, with one implying the next. We further demonstrate that free trade can reduce world total output and total consumer surplus as well as world welfare. Along the way, we correct several oversights in the literature.