Small firm mutual funds: Additional evidence on the small firm effect

Returns generated with small firm mutual fund data are used to examine the extent to which identification of a small firm effect is due to the difficulty in measuring the direct and indirect transaction costs involved in investing in the common shares of small capitalization stocks. Little if any evidence of the excess risk-adjusted returns is obtained for either of the period 1978–1983, when the small firm effect was observed, or the period 1984–1989, when it was not. The small firm effect may therefore be attributed to (1) higher direct transaction costs including bid-ask spread and broker fees and (2) higher indirect transaction costs including portfolio management expenses and market impact costs.The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Brett Salazar for valuable assistance in data collection. Errors remain our own.     

Integration of collective bargaining and formal worker participation processes: Boon or barrier to worker rights?

Many employers are extending workplace rights by allowing for more employee voice in decision making. Numerous unionized organizations have established formal worker participation processes to help achieve this end and to improve organizational performance. Based largely on theory, such processes are normally designed to operate independently from the bargaining process. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between participation and bargaining processes, and the effect of this relationship on workplace satisfaction. A total of 712 Midwest union officials were surveyed, and the results indicate that the processes tend to become integrated in the workplace. Further, union officials' workplace satisfaction was greater where formal worker participation is institutionalized within the bargaining process.     

A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF LEADERSHIP: PARTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF PROBLEM STRUCTURE AND LEADER POWER

This study explores the effects of task structure and leader power on participative leadership across Australian, African, Papua-New Guinea and Pacific Island managers. Managers in all national groups are more participative in situations of low structure and low power than for high structure and high power, respectively. Participation in situations of low structure and low power declines in the order: Australia, Africa, Papua-New Guinea, Pacific Islands. It is argued that this effect is an instrumental effect of managerial education, rather than being culturally determined. the Vroom-Yetton leadership methodology is used to measure participation levels. Subjects are a total of 150 middle-level managers attending management education courses.     

On estimating the mean of the selected normal population under the LINEX loss function

Following Parsian and Farsipour (1999), we consider the problem of estimating the mean of the selected normal population, from two normal populations with unknown means and common known variance, under the LINEX loss function. Some admissibility results for a subclass of equivariant estimators are derived and a sufficient condition for the inadmissibility of an arbitrary equivariant estimator is provided. As a consequence, several of the estimators proposed by Parsian and Farsipour (1999) are shown to be inadmissible and better estimators are obtained. Received January 2001/Revised May 2002     

An effective step-down algorithm for the construction and the identification of nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays

In this paper we present an effective algorithm for the construction and the identification of two-level nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays. Using this algorithm, we identify and list a full catalogue of nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays with parameters OA(24,7,2,t), OA(28,6,2,t) and OA(32,6,2,t), t ≥ 2. Some statistical properties of these designs are also considered.     

The impact of the WARN Act on firm value

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act of 1989 mandated that at least 60 days advance notice be given to employees. Critics argued that its passage would decrease managerial flexibility in closing plants, subsequently reducing firm values. This study addresses this issue by examining the stock market's reaction to announcements leading to the eventual enactment of the WARN legislation. We find evidence indicating negative effects of the legislation on stock returns of small firms.     

Managerial bonding and stock liquidity: An analysis of dual-class firms

Given the decision to create a second class of stock through a dual-class structure, we propose that management is more (less) likely to create a liquid secondary market for both classes of shares the lower (higher) its willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance. If market makers recognize this relation, they should assign a higher likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of firms that list both classes of stock and a lower likelihood for firms that list only one class of stock pursuant to recapitalization. Additionally, they should assign a lower likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of IPOs that choose a dual-class structure and list only one class relative to IPOs that remain single-class. Our empirical tests based on IPOS and recaps between 1985 and 1988 provide support for these propositions.