Evidence that Prices Do Not Fully Reflect the Implications of Current Earnings for Future Earnings: An Experimental Markets Approach*

Abstract. Analysts have been found to underweight the innovation in the most recent quarterly earnings when forecasting next-quarter earnings, and these expectations have been posited as an explanation for post-earnings-announcement drift. This study uses an experimental asset market to examine whether similar errors in forecasting quarterly earnings are made by student-subjects. We examine two aspects of their behavior: (1) do subjects underestimate the autocorrelation in quarterly earnings when forming earnings expectations? and (2) are asset prices consistent with a subject's underestimation of the autocorrelation in quarterly earnings? We observe subject errors in forecasts that underweight extreme innovations in the most recent quarterly earnings by approximately 40 percent. The prices in the experimental markets also fail to reflect fully the most recent innovation in quarterly earnings. We are able to predict the sign of the incorrect pricing, from the mean initial earnings predictions of the subjects, in 74 percent of the 135 markets. These forecast errors observed in this study are consistent with forecast errors observed for analysts, and this consistency suggests that errors in analysts' forecasts may be at least partially attributable to the use of judgmental heuristics.     

Acquisition of Divested Assets and Shareholders' Wealth

The divesting of corporate assets has become quite popular. Previous studies of divestitures have found conflicting impacts upon shareholders' wealth of the buying firm. This study measures the impacts of product-line relatedness between the acquiring firm and the divested unit and financial weakness of the selling firm upon the abnormal returns to the acquiring firm. Although the study finds that the impact of financial strength of the seller is ambiguous, the purchase of related assets produces more wealth than does the purchase of unrelated divested units. Further, firms that purchase related divested units have larger proportions of insider ownership.     

Private transnational governance in the heyday of the nation‐state: the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF)1

This article examines an example of private transnational governance in the first decades after the Second World War: the Council of European Industrial Federations (CEIF), created in 1949 by the peak‐level trade associations in western Europe. Based on this case, the article takes issue with two predominant views in the current literature: a view that sees the European integration process, at least in its early stages, as driven largely by nation‐states and political agendas; and another view, widespread among business and economic historians, that contacts between business associations at that time served the main purpose of re‐establishing international cartels. The CEIF actually performed a wide variety of functions: it represented organized business at international events and in organizations, acted as a multilateral arena for the exchange of information and for building trust among the businesspeople of various European countries, and, from 1958 onwards, helped bridge the divide between those inside and those outside the Common Market. On occasions, for example, in the case of export incentives, it even managed to forge a consensus for policy action when national governments were unable to agree.