From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences

This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism. This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives, as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world, that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness, constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics.     

Climate protection and compact urban structures in spatial planning and local construction plans in Germany

The paper discusses opportunities for integration of the climate protection strategy declared by the German government into spatial and urban land-use plans in Germany.     

Lessons from Constitutional Culture and the History of Constitutional Transfer: A Hope for Constitutionally Limited Government?

The literature shows a clear correlation between sound constitutional environments and human flourishing. However, the path to adoption of sound constitutions is much less clear. This paper turns to the history of constitutional transfer to propose an alternative to taxonomies offered in the literature, which typically classify constitutions either by governmental structure (presidential v. parliamentary, or centralized v. federalist) or by source of influence (e.g. US 1787, Spain 1812, France 1958). These classifications are found wanting; instead, this paper proposes a new taxonomy based on the origin of the constitutional ideas and adoption. Formal constitutional parchment must match informal constitutional culture, so a constitution’s likelihood of success is greatest when the ideas are indigenous; the source of adoption is ultimately secondary. The paper closes with four case studies of constitutional transfer and adoption.     

The Role of Language in the Communication Process Between Business and Government: Evidence from Russian Firms

Abstract

The paper investigates how language facilitates communication process between government and business. We use Russian context to show barriers and challenges of using language in official communication between governmental authorities and Russian companies. In our work, we demonstrate how language may produce employee’s misunderstanding and discuss typical sources of ineffective usage of language. The results indicate that problematic issues of both linguistic and non-linguistic nature can lead to serious implications for successful communication between government and business in Russia. We found that documentations’ complexity, which is perceived as such due to a complicated subject area they belong to (legal, tax, etc.) and language insufficiency applied are most likely to raise multiple problems related to government’s communication with business.     

Praxeology,Experimental Economics and the Process of Choice: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith on the Misesian Action Axiom

Mises’s action axiom postulates that human action is purposeful behavior. While this axiom is the building block for a powerful methodology, it is also incomplete, because it sets aside the underlying processes of decision-making. And while Mises does not dismiss the gap between intention and action, he is silent on it, relegating such a study to psychology. We contend that a study of underlying thought patterns and the process of choice – rather than contradicting praxeology and the action axiom – in fact complements the writings of Mises. To demonstrate this, we look at two authors: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith. Hayek’s theory of the sensory order sheds light on the process of choice, and explains how decision-making is contextually embedded. Smith’s concepts of ecological rationality and neurological “hard-wiring” help us understand decision-making. We argue that cognitive foundations enrich our understanding of the process of choice, and thus of the Misesian action axiom.     

A FIRST‐ORDER BSPDE FOR SWING OPTION PRICING: CLASSICAL SOLUTIONS

In a companion paper, we studied a control problem related to swing option pricing in a general non‐Markovian setting. The main result there shows that the value process of this control problem can uniquely be characterized in terms of a first‐order backward stochastic partial differential equation (BSPDE) and a pathwise differential inclusion. In this paper, we additionally assume that the cash flow process of the swing option is left‐continuous in expectation. Under this assumption, we show that the value process is continuously differentiable in the space variable that represents the volume in which the holder of the option can still exercise until maturity. This gives rise to an existence and uniqueness result for the corresponding BSPDE in a classical sense. We also explicitly represent the space derivative of the value process in terms of a nonstandard optimal stopping problem over a subset of predictable stopping times. This representation can be applied to derive a dual minimization problem in terms of martingales.     

Perfect Information and Potential Games

Games with perfect information giving rise to potential normal forms are described. For agent normal forms, a potential is defined such that a strategy profile is a maximizer for the potential if and only if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the normal form of any game with perfect information, every better reply path where the players do not change their choices at irrelevant nodes leads to an equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

How long memory in volatility affects true dependence structure

Long memory in volatility is a stylized fact found in most financial return series. This paper empirically investigates the extent to which interdependence in emerging markets may be driven by conditional short and long range dependence in volatility. We fit copulas to pairs of raw and filtered returns, analyse the observed changes in the dependence structure may be driven by volatility, and discuss whether or not asymmetries on propagation of crisis may be interpreted as intrinsic characteristics of the markets. We also use the findings to construct portfolios possessing desirable expected behavior such as dependence at extreme positive levels.