FiMod — A DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations

This paper develops a medium-scale dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model for fiscal policy simulations. Relative to existing models of this type, our model incorporates two important features. First, we consider a two-country monetary union structure, which makes it well suited to simulate fiscal measures by relatively large countries in a currency area. Second, we provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the government expenditures side, by explicitly distinguishing between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, public purchases and the public sector wage bill. In addition, we consider a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, which allows to analyze the response of equilibrium unemployment to fiscal measures. In order to illustrate some of its applications, and motivated by recent policy debate in the Euro Area, we calibrate the model to Spain and the rest of the area and simulate a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios. We find that, in terms of output and employment losses, fiscal consolidation is the least damaging when achieved by reducing the public sector wage bill, whereas it is most damaging when carried out by cutting public investment.     

Form and content of replacement cost information: The impact upon investment criteria

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently required that certain registrants disclose specific current replacement cost information when filing their 10-K's. In the current research, unsophisticated investor surrogates were asked to perform an investment task using historical cost and/or variations of actual current replacement cost data for several companies. It was found that neither the content nor the form of the alternative information sets significantly affected the investor decisions.     

The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

In his 1960 seminal contribution to game theory and its applications, The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling suggested that in international negotiations, strong international opposition may be an asset rather than a liability. Rather than constraining it, the opposition would enlarge the opportunity set thus making it easier to successfully conclude international negotiations. This property, which is also known as the Schelling-conjecture, shares some aspects with constitutional economics, namely the two-level approach suggesting that it might be beneficial for all parties to give up some power by tying one??s hands. In this paper we examine by means of a simulation study how far we can take this notion in the politics of trade integration. In explicitly marrying Schelling??s 1960 idea with the 1988 two-level approach by Putnam and embedding the result into the political economy of trade we find that the threat of a domestic opposition or national institution having a veto power frequently but not always delivers a more favorable outcome for the respective trade representative at the international table. Whether the Schelling-conjecture applies or not actually depends on the subtle interplay of a ??bully effect?? and a ??serenity effect??.     

Political Repression and Child Labour: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Most normative studies on child labour arrive at the conclusion that child labour is detrimental to social welfare. Child labour is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries even though in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a political‐economic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labour legislation. The most important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimes enforcement is more lenient and child labour thus more prevalent than in countries enjoying political freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data.     

Public–Private Partnership’s Procurement Criteria: The case of managing stakeholders’ value creation in Kazakhstan

Abstract

The article presents the study of the criteria that Kazakhstan’s government used for granting a public–private partnership (PPP) contract to a private investor for construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda during 14 years. From the perspective of value creation for critical stakeholders, there was often misalignment between bidders’ views of these criteria and the perceived value for citizens and the government. The latter may significantly enhance the creation of shared values in a PPP by actively engaging stakeholders in the design of the bids’ assessment criteria.     

Thoughts on a Fiscal Union in EMU

Using an estimated large‐scale New Keynesian model, we assess the consequences of introducing a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Comparing long‐term, that is, steady state, effects we have winners and losers depending on the scenario. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks are minor. This also explains why welfare differences are small across the fiscal union scenarios. A counterfactual exercise indicates that with a fiscal union regime already installed at the start of EMU, key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly while debt dynamics would have changed notably.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

The current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer confined to developing economies. Following crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative dynamic macro models of sovereign default has been advancing rapidly. Current debate should take note of the findings of this literature – an extensive overview of which has been provided in this paper. This paper also discusses the inherent difficulties as well as possibilities of integrating this type of model into standard business cycle models (RBC and DSGE models). This is likely to be particularly helpful when using models to analyse upcoming issues in the euro area, such as a suitable sovereign insolvency law or the assumption of joint liability.     

A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders

Much of the literature on corporate performance focuses on institutional restructuring, and implicitly assumes that constitutional factors are determined exogenously. Existing theories of the firm—whether a “goal paradigm” or an “exchange paradigm”—provide useful insights; but we find them incomplete because they miss the extent to which companies build unique and meaningful constitutional orders. Building on Vanberg (Const Polit Econ 3(2):223–253, 1992), we investigate the extent to which the field of constitutional political economy (CPE) can improve our understanding of organisations, by providing a typology of CPE that can be applied to a study of firms. We make a distinction among (1) operational; (2) institutional; and (3) constitutional levels of management, and based on the CPE literature argue that “constitutional” considerations help us to define the boundaries of a firm and its operational environment.