Horizontal Mergers and Merger Waves in a Location Model

We consider sequential mergers in a spatial model with Cournot competition. This model is suitable for explaining the behaviour of some industries where several brands of the same product are delivered by plants. The automobile and oil product industries are examples. To discuss sequential mergers, we use the method of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998). We show that if the transportation cost per length is large relative to market size, a merger wave occurs. In addition, it might improve social surplus. On the other hand, if the transportation cost per length is relatively small, a merger wave does not occur even though firms would be better off with sequential mergers.
We also compare our model to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992) who consider horizontal mergers with spatial price competition. We show that in a merger of neighbouring firms the merged firm's profit decreases. This result is opposite to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992).
Finally, we consider how a regulator affects sequential mergers. When each merger occurs, the regulator assesses each merger. In this case, there is a possibility that the existence of the regulator deters welfare-improving sequential mergers.     

Interlinkage and Generous Tit‐for‐Tat Strategy

We investigate an infinitely‐repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect monitoring and consider the possibility that the interlinkage of the players' distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a generous tit‐for‐tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.     

WHY DO LARGE FIRMS TEND TO INTEGRATE VERTICALLY?

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between firm size and vertical structures. The framework is based on a Hotelling model with three downstream and three upstream firms. We show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation and show the strategic complementarity of product positioning. We also show that the downstream firm that has the largest market share is more likely to integrate vertically. Enhancing the degree of product differentiation is more beneficial for the large firm than for the rest of the downstream firms because the large firm supplies a large amount of product.     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

Should Firms Employ Personalized Pricing?

This paper theoretically considers a duopoly model in which all firms do not always employ personalized pricing. Our model incorporates the fact that firms engage in marginal cost‐reducing activities after they decide whether to employ personalized pricing. When the ex ante cost difference between the firms is large, the less‐efficient firm does not employ personalized pricing even when the fixed cost to do so is zero. This is because employing personalized pricing induces the rival firm to engage more in reducing its costs, which is more likely to harm the less‐efficient firm.     

Welfare properties of strategic R&D investments in Hotelling models

In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments.     

Business process semi-automation based on business model management

It is important to respond to customers' requirements more rapidly than ever before due to the recent trend in e-business and its technologies. In order to achieve an agile response, we have to manage business models, to reflect the changes in the models and to develop or modify IT systems for further chances. This paper proposes a management framework of layered enterprise models. The proposed framework consists of a business model repository and a software repository, and defines three different grain sizes of modeling layers, namely business modeling, business process modeling and business application modeling, in order to support business modeling and application development. This framework helps us to develop business application in incremental deployment of analysis, design, and implementation to execute business processes. We have implemented a prototype environment using Java. Each repository's contents are described using XML so that the repositories are interoperable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collectively accepted social norms and performativity: the pursuit of normativity of globalization in economic institutions

ABSTRACT

Although the philosophical literature on social institutions has been insightful for social scientific studies, the application of its core concepts, such as collective intentionality, to real institutional dynamics remains challenging. One factor contributing to this situation is insufficient work that identifies collectively accepted social norms and shows how they constitute social institutions. Relying on the perspectives of John Searle and Raimo Tuomela, this study integrates recent analyses of the concept of performativity with discourse analysis. It presents an analytic framework, drawing on the concept of nominalization, to identify collectively accepted social norms that performatively constitute social institutions. Finally, it illustrates the identification of collectively accepted ‘globalization’ that performatively constitutes and shapes economic institutions engaged in corporate financial reporting. This study contributes to closing the gap between philosophical analyses of social institutions and social scientific studies by highlighting the performance of nominalized collectively accepted social norms.     

Does yardstick regulation really work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry

This paper investigates the effectiveness of yardstick regulation by using a data set of rail companies in Japan and estimating the variable frontier cost function. In the variable cost function, both the coefficient of the yardstick regulation dummy and the coefficient of the competitive pressure outside the industry show the negative sign with statistical significance, indicating that the introduction of yardstick regulation and competition tend to decrease a rail company’s variable cost. Between 1995 and 2000, railways to which yardstick regulation was applied improved cost efficiency by about 11.5%.     

Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry

We investigate whether or not privatization is beneficial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic competition model. We discuss the relationship between the welfare effects of privatization and the degree of foreign direct investment in the private sector, which is an important problem in developing countries and in transition economies such as China and Central and Eastern European countries. We find that, in the long run, privatization of a public firm is more likely to improve welfare when the country depends on foreign capital in the private sector, whereas the opposite tendency exists in the short run.