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Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude
is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location.
We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however,
agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the
most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two. 相似文献
33.
Noriaki Matsushima 《Journal of Economics》2008,95(3):233-253
This paper investigates the imposition of a binding price ceiling and how it affects overall welfare and the location of a
monopolist that is price-discriminating between two markets. The analysis shows that the imposition of a price-ceiling induces
the monopolist to locate at the regulated market and that the imposition may actually reduce welfare. The setting is extended
to a duopoly market. Two types of regulation are considered. The welfare implications of the regulations are discussed.
相似文献
34.
Hiroshi Kitamura Noriaki Matsushima Misato Sato 《The Journal of industrial economics》2023,71(2):441-463
We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient. 相似文献
35.
Hiroshi Kitamura Noriaki Matsushima Misato Sato 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2023,32(1):158-176
We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry. 相似文献
36.
We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates. 相似文献