Fixed Asset Revaluation and Equity Depletion in the UK

UK GAAP has traditionally allowed the write-off of purchased goodwill directly to reserves, resulting in the widespread depletion of book equity. Companies have also been permitted to revalue fixed assets at management's discretion. This study examines whether upward revaluations have been associated with the depletion of book equity and with other costly contracting explanations identified in prior research. Our results provide strong support for the equity depletion hypothesis, both with regard to the decision to revalue and the timing of the revaluations. Indebtedness, liquidity, size and fixed asset intensity are also consistently associated with upward revaluation.     

Overzicht van buitenlandsche tijdschriften

Jaartal en blz. achter de namen der tijdschriften hebben betrekking op de plaats, waar deze laatstelijk in De Economist werden behandeld.     

Do switching costs make markets more or less competitive? The case of 800‐number portability

Do switching costs reduce or intensify price competition if firms charge the same price to existing and new consumers? I study 800‐number portability to determine how switching costs affect price competition under a single price regime. AT&T and MCI reduced their toll‐free services prices in response to portability, implying that reduced switching costs increased competition. Despite rapid market growth, gains from higher prices to “locked‐in” consumers exceeded the incentives to capture new consumers. Prices on larger contracts dropped more, consistent with greater lock‐in for larger users. Price changes between portability's announcement and implementation are consistent with rational expectations.     

Assessing the competitive power of a region

The paper explores theoretical approaches to estimating a region’s competitiveness and its underlying factors. The competitive power indicators of the economic complex of Mogilev oblast, Belarus, are analyzed and its regional competitiveness is estimated on the basis of statistical data.     

Prizes and patents: Using market signals to provide incentives for innovations

We consider environments in which agents other than innovator receive the signals about the quality of innovation. We study whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. If such mechanisms are used, the innovator has incentives to manipulate market signals. We show that if an innovator cannot manipulate market signals, then the efficient levels of innovation can be uniquely implemented without deadweight losses – for example, by using prizes. Patents are necessary if the innovator can manipulate market signals. For an intermediate case of costly signal manipulation, both patents and prizes may be optimal.