Interruption insurance for generation and distribution of electric power

We describe a simple insurance scheme for use in an environment in which consumers of electricity are differentiated by their value of uninterrupted service as well as their location. Location plays a determining role in the model, in that reliability of distribution is allowed to vary throughout the network. Consumers choose a level of compensation for service interruption and pay a premium that depends on this compensation, as well as the distribution reliability at their location. In the event of power shortages, the utility will interrupt consumers according to their selected compensation so as to minimize compensation payments. The premium schedule is designed to induce consumer self-selection which results in efficient rationing, i.e., consumers are interrupted in increasing order of their interruption losses. The tariff has the added feature of inducing consumers to purchase full insurance and thus transfers all of the risk to the utility. It is shown that with proper tuning the proposed insurance scheme is Pareto superior to a uniform service charge with random rationing.     

How good are supply function equilibrium models: an empirical analysis of the ERCOT balancing market

We present an empirical analysis of a supply function equilibrium model in the Texas spot electricity market. We derive conditions for optimal bidding behavior in a spot market with ex ante bilaterally contracted sales. By estimating costs, we are able to derive a set of ex post-and ex ante-optimal supply functions and use a non-parametric behavioral model to compare our theoretically optimal supply functions to actual offers made. Our results show that with the exception of the largest generators, firms make offers with markups and markdowns far in excess of what a model of profit-maximizing behavior suggests.     

Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Here it comes: defined contribution health care

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes provisions to make the individual health insurance marketplace one where all Americans, including those with preexisting health conditions, can obtain affordable coverage. At the same time, the act has failed to address, in any significant way, many of the underlying flaws in the current U.S. health care system that have caused costs to spiral out of control. The combination of persistent U.S. health care cost increases and a viable individual health insurance marketplace will cause a sea change in employer-sponsored health care offerings that is similar to that seen among employer-sponsored retirement benefit plans: movement away from defined benefit approaches and toward defined contribution designs. Although the authors show parallels between the evolution of employers' health care and retirement offerings, they explain why certain key developments will need to occur before defined contribution approaches become as prevalent in employer-sponsored health care plans as they are in today's employer-sponsored retirement plans.     

创业即社会责任

社会责任不是指公司成功了再来从事公益事业,也不是不图利润而一味地奉献社会,而是个人创业的本身就是社会责任的实现。这种创业模式往往也会使公司获利成功。     

绝处逢生

上次我们说的是＂我若为我,我是何人＂在创业中的体现,这次我们来讲讲在逆境中,人怎样改变自己的命运,来实现对自己与社会的责任。本来《圣经》没有书写下来,而都是口口相传的。最后写下来的只是原来《圣经》的一部分,其它的大都失传了,所以口授的《圣经》（密西拿）在犹太教当中也占有非常重要的地位。上次提到的生活在公元前一世纪的拉比沙迈（Shamai）与大祭司希列尔（Hilel）是他们那一代唯一口授《圣经》的人,犹太人将后来收集起来的他们的话看作是含有某种神秘色彩的智慧。希列尔有一句非常著名的话：＂我不为我,谁人为我？我若为我,我是何人？若非现在,