Growth and inequality in the great and little divergence debate: a Japanese perspective

This article addresses the question of growth and inequality in the great and little divergence trajectories on both sides of Eurasia. A social table constructed for Tokugawa Japan in the 1840s is compared with two cases with high levels of inequality, Stuart England and Mughal India, and the subsequent changes in the three countries are traced to the modern era of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Japanese pattern in the early modern period can be characterized by comparatively modest growth with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income between the social classes, but the pattern changed during the subsequent half‐century to one with an increased tempo of growth and a substantial rise in the level of income inequality. The implications of this finding are discussed in terms of the concept of Smithian growth and are placed in the comparative context of the divergence debate.     

The SIML Estimation of Integrated Covariance and Hedging Coefficient Under Round-off Errors,Micro-market Price Adjustments and Random Sampling

For estimating the integrated volatility and covariance by using high frequency data, Kunitomo and Sato (Math Comput Simul 81:1272–1289, 2011; N Am J Econ Finance 26:289–309, 2013) have proposed the separating information maximum likelihood (SIML) method when there are micro-market noises. The SIML estimator has reasonable finite sample properties and asymptotic properties when the sample size is large when the hidden efficient price process follows a Brownian semi-martingale. We shall show that the SIML estimation is useful for estimating the integrated covariance and hedging coefficient when we have round-off errors, micro-market price adjustments and noises, and when the high-frequency data are randomly sampled. The SIML estimation is consistent, asymptotically normal in the stable convergence sense under a set of reasonable assumptions and it has reasonable finite sample properties with these effects.     

Beyond Brenner's investment overhang hypothesis: the case of the steel industry

This article challenges the way liberal economic governance has come to be theorised as a passive and depoliticised form of governance. Using the classic case of the gold standard, it shows how state intervention came to be shaped by considerations of state power and diverged considerably from the traditional emphasis on free markets and stable conditions of investments. As I argue, the gold standard was constructed through political struggles over monetary governance which involved significant constraints for capitalist investors. Its institutions helped establish a new structure for exerting control over finance. By resituating the gold standard in a broader historical perspective, I show how nineteenth-century monetary governance, far from leading to a retreat of the state, established in fact the foundations of a new form of state intervention: modern central banking.     

Comparative analysis of health care costs in Japan and the United States: a simulation of productivity and savings behavior

Japan and the United States, though contrastive in terms of the percentage of the elderly in their population and the ratio of their health care costs to GDP, both face soaring medical expenditures. Sato et al. [Health Care Systems in Japan and the United States: A Simulation Studies and Policy Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Hingham, MA] developed a model to solve this problem by increasing the productivity of the non-health care sector. This study has applied that model to estimate national savings, and compared these savings with estimated health care costs. The results show that in order for savings to exceed expenditures the US needs to have a higher savings rate and a higher interest rate than Japan.     

Globalization and economic inequality in the short and long run: The case of South Korea 1975–1995

We analyse the determinants of the Gini coefficient for income and expenditure in South Korea between 1975 and 1995. In both cases, we do not find support for the Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis. From an economic globalization viewpoint, the opening of goods markets reduces income inequality in both the short run (the Gini coefficient for income) and the long run (the Gini coefficient for expenditure). On the other hand, the opening of capital markets increases income inequality in both the short and the long run, although the latter is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the effect of economic globalization on income inequality has two routes and two different speeds.     

Small business in Japan: A historical perspective

Small firms have been considered to be an important element of the industrial structure in Japan since the turn of the century. In this paper the history of small business in Japan is examined. In particular, the dramatic development of the technological and managerial ability of small firms within the last two decades is analyzed. Under the regime of rapid industrial restructuring in Japan, small firms are identified as developing their own diversive management strategies, especially with respect to international trade and the implementation of information and high technology.     

Accountability and the debt crisis

The international debt crisis is viewed here as only a symptom—its underlying causes have resulted from a crisis in management among the major actors in the development process, namely commercial banks, recipient countries and development assistance agencies. The cumulative effect has been a lack of accountability that puts the development objectives themselves into jeopardy. This article proposes that all actors should write off their debt for failed projects, that the development assistance system be redesigned, and that a strategy be developed to help countries design and manage development programmes appropriate to their unique circumstances.     

Intergovernmental Transfers,Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization

We provide a model incorporating features of local public finance in Japan, including close fiscal ties between different levels of government as well as bureaucratic determinations of intergovernmental transfers. The discretionary nature of transfers softens local budgets ex post, which exerts perverse incentive effects on local governments ex ante. Fiscal decentralization that assigns more revenue responsibility to the local level serves to counteract this moral hazard incentive. The emphasis is on the endogenous nature of regional fiscal capacities at the local level. Fiscal devolution motivates local jurisdictions to become fiscally independent wherever possible. JEL Classification Number: H7.