不同视角下的中国城镇社会保障制度与收入再分配——基于年度收入和终生收入的经验分析

本文利用中国社会科学院经济研究所收入分配课题组1995年和2002年两次城镇居民住户调查数据，从不同的角度分析了中国城镇社会保障制度在收入再分配方面发挥的作用。我们发现总体上中国城镇社会保障制度缩小了个人收入差距，降低了相对贫困率，具有正的再分配效应。但社会保障对劳动年龄人群和老年人群的收入再分配作用非常不同，社会保障的再分配主要不是通过收入阶层间的再分配，而是通过代际间的收入再分配实现的。高收入人群通过社会保障体系转移出去的收入很少，中国社会保障费用负担的累进性很低。另外，与1995年相比，2002年时社会保障缩小收入差距的作用下降，相对贫困率有所上升。我们还发现从劳动年龄人群代际内的收入转移看，以终生收入为基础估计的养老保险制度的长期收入再分配效应大干以年度收入为基础估计的当期再分配效应，机关和事业单位人员是否实行改革后的养老保险方案对整个养老保险制度的长期收入再分配效应的影响非常大。     

Circular domains

I introduce the notion of circular domains and prove that on any circular domain there is no strategy-proof and nondictatorial social choice function. Moreover, I show that on any proper subset of a minimal circular domain, there exists a group strategy-proof and essential social choice function. These results together detect the minimal size of the domains over which the incompatibility arises with respect to pairs of democratic-incentive requirements (nondictatorial, strategy-proof) and (essential, group strategy-proof).     

Tradition and interaction: research trends in modern Japanese industrial history

This paper surveys research findings since the early 1970s, focusing on the growth processes of both traditional and modern industries and their relations with government activity in the period between the 1870s and 1940. Most of the surveyed research can be seen as a response to two theses: first, that pre-1940 Japan was essentially a market-led economy; and second, that the traditional sector did not decline in the industrialisation process, but in fact prospered. The survey argues that there were a good deal of interactions between the modern and traditional sectors at regional levels and that the regional economy occupied a significant place in the ways in which government business relations were structured.     

PAYG pension systems with capital mobility

This paper studies the design of an optimal pension scheme in an OLG and open economy model. The pension scheme provides a flat rate benefit and is based on the PAYG principle. It thus combines inter- and intra-generational redistribution. In this setting a number of symmetric economies are connected by an open and perfect capital market. When this number is very large, we have the small open economy case; when it is reduced to one, we have the case of autarky or perfect coordination. As the number of countries increases, there is more intragenerational redistribution, but less capital accumulation. JEL Code H55 · H87     

对董事注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源分析

当事人之间的权力不对称容易导致董事的忠诚义务的形成,忠实义务等董事的义务的产生与一方拥有权力而另外一方相对没有权力的情况有关,但是其更重要的原因是委托人对受托人产生的信赖。美国的董事承担注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源是受托义务,日本则是委任合同,两者有所不同。信托理论能更好地说明忠诚义务产生的原因。而与信托理论相比,委任理论对信赖的保护的必要性程度相对比较低,委任理论只能说明注意义务的产生。     

Entrepreneurship and asymmetric information in input markets

Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets, and entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. The market equilibrium can involve an excess supply of workers entering the entrepreneurial sector, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of both entrepreneurs and workers opting for the entrepreneurial sector. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and on wages can improve efficiency, but a second-best optimum can only be achieved if it is optimal to induce an excess supply of workers to enter the entrepreneurial sector.     

Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition

Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal withholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.     

Determinants of tourists' expenditure at mass participant sport events: a five-year analysis

Using the five-year data of a US running event (N?=?9380), this study examined key determinants of tourists' expenditure in a mass participant sport event. Economic constraint, travel-related, socio-demographic, and sport-related facets were integrated into the expenditure model while considering changes in tourism prices. The proposed four-facet model provides a broader framework for event organisers and destination marketers in evaluating what factors determine participants' spending behaviours while at the destination, thereby maximising the potential economic benefits of hosting a participant sport event.     

Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer

This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealings with potential downstream competition. Unlike in previous studies, the incumbent can establish a direct retailer with some fixed payment and can offer an exclusive contract to a downstream buyer twice. We show that the existence of these two options helps the incumbent deter socially efficient entry and earn almost monopoly profits even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition.     

The Emergence of “Modern” Ownership Rights Rather than Property Rights

There are a number of analytical conundrums in the neo-classical theory of the emergence of private ownership rights, which is closely associated with Demsetz’s works. Reconsidering the internal logic of private ownership rights, the paper argues that, first, the emergence of “modern” private ownership rights should be the subject of analysis rather than ownership rights per se. Second, at least for some latecomer countries, modern ownership rights typically emerge when feudalistic multi-layered proprietary rights over land are abolished and replaced by ownership rights for the purpose of ensuring tax revenue, prompted by pressure from and/or the intrusion of a colonial power, rather than as an efficient response to changes in resource prices. Third, the socio-economic aspect of ownership rights that related to the manner of social formation tended to be concealed in the universal aspect of private property rights that focuses on the materialistic relation between a person and a thing. These arguments urge the bringing of social relations into the basic layer of analysis of ownership rights theory, as the original institutional economists such as Ely and Commons considered.