The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion

We study the effectson tax enforcement and tax policy of unintentional complianceerrors by taxpayers and administrative errors by tax auditors.The government can impose both penalties for misreporting andrewards for honest reporting. Maximal sanctions will not be appliedbecause errors are possible, so evasion cannot be eliminatedcostlessly. Under optimal policy intentional evasion can be deterred,but innocent tax evaders must be penalized whether they haveunintentionally evaded or have been mistakenly convicted. Thisdeters intentional evasion, but limits redistribution. Withoutrewards for honest reporting, the revelation principle need notapply, so intentional evasion can occur.     

AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN JAPAN: TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper examines if the effects of agglomeration economies are manifested in technical efficiency and generate faster economic growth and higher (lower) levels of employment (unemployment). Using the prefecture level data for each of the two-digit groups of industries in Japan, it estimates a region-specific technical efficiency index based on the stochastic frontier production function framework. The factor analysis shows that in most of the industry-groups, efficiency has a positive association with external scale variable(s). Though the relationship is not very strong, it would be erroneous to ignore the effect of agglomeration economies on efficiency. For some light goods industries, the agglomeration effect is relatively stronger. Economic growth varies positively with external scale variable(s) and the unemployment rate tends to fall with respect to growth and concentration. This suggests that measures against industrial concentration may be counter-productive, particularly in the context of globalization when countries greatly need to raise productivity.     

VAT and the taxation of rents

Cash-flow corporate taxes can tax corporate-source rents and avoid some of the distortions on investment and financing caused by conventional corporate taxes. However, cash-flow taxes applied on an origin basis are prone to international profit-shifting, which can lead to a competitive reduction in tax rates. While this can be avoided by a destination-based cash-flow tax, most countries have opted for origin-based taxation, asserting the right to tax rents generated within their jurisdictions. Since a value-added tax (VAT) implicitly includes rents in its base, it can complement origin-based corporate taxation. We compare and contrast the use of destination and origin VATs as complements to an origin-based cash-flow corporate tax.     

Does IFRS Adoption Accelerate M&A? The Consequences of Different Goodwill Accounting in Japan

International Advances in Economic Research - This study investigates how the gap in goodwill accounting between the Japanese local accounting standards (Japanese generally accepted accounting...     

AN INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION IN AN EAST ASIAN MARKET ECONOMY? TOKUGAWA JAPAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GREAT DIVERGENCE

This paper addresses a question raised by Jan de Vries' on the relationship between industriousness and the rise of the market in East Asia. Was the growing industriousness in Tokugawa Japan, as de Vries suggests, a substitute ‘for the absence of markets’? The examination refers to two versions of Chayanov's peasant farm model and their empirical relevance to the Tokugawa agrarian history, with special reference to the formation of labour‐intensive peasant farming (Akira Hayami's version of an industrious revolution), product specialisation, and the markets for production factors, land, and labour. Its implications for the Great Divergence debate are also discussed.     

Distributional preference in Japan

Using experiments developed by Engelmann and Strobel ( 2004 ), this study investigates distributional preference in Japan. We find that just over half the people in the study have a maximin preference, approximately 7 to 19% have an efficiency preference, approximately 8% have a self‐interest preference, and approximately 18% chose the allocation that would reduce the payoff to the rich and the poor, given that her/his payoff would remain constant. The last preference could be interpreted as what is referred to as “malice”, “deep envy” or a “feeling of vulnerability” in behavioural economics and cross‐cultural psychology.