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71.
In this paper we compare alternative asymptotic approximations to the power of the likelihood ratio test used in covariance structure analysis for testing the fit of a model. Alternative expressions for the noncentrality parameter (ncp) lead to different approximations to the power function. It appears that for alternative covariance matrices close to the null hypothesis, the alternative ncp's lead to similar values, while for alternative covariance matrices far from Ho the different expressions for the ncp can conflict substantively. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the ncp proposed in Satorra and Saris (1985) gives the most accurate power approximations. 相似文献
72.
This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes. 相似文献
73.
74.
Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants. 相似文献
75.
76.
This paper compares the output and revenue effects in the rate-of-return regulated monopoly model. Both the ad valorem and the unit tax generally decrease the use of capital, and as such, reduce the output and raise the price. In addition, it is shown that Suits and Musgrave's conclusion of higher revenue of an ad valorem tax at a given output can apply to a regulated monopolist if the marginal product of labor under the ad valorem tax is greater than or equal to that under the unit tax. Similarly, their second conclusion, that for a given tax revenue an ad valorem tax has a larger output than a unit tax rate before the revenue-maximizing tax rate, can also apply to the regulated monopolist. 相似文献
77.
78.
An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
79.
Hélder Vasconcelos 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2008,17(4):973-1010
The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry. 相似文献
80.
Richard P. O’Neill Emily Bartholomew Fisher Benjamin F. Hobbs Ross Baldick 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2008,34(3):220-250
The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive
power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially
settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for
both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices,
if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission.
The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.
相似文献