Using Neural Data to Test a Theory of Investor Behavior: An Application to Realization Utility

We conduct a study in which subjects trade stocks in an experimental market while we measure their brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging. All of the subjects trade in a suboptimal way. We use the neural data to test a “realization utility” explanation for their behavior. We find that activity in two areas of the brain that are important for economic decision‐making exhibit activity consistent with the predictions of realization utility. These results provide support for the realization utility model. More generally, they demonstrate that neural data can be helpful in testing models of investor behavior.     

RENAISSANCE OR REQUIEM: IS NUCLEAR ENERGY COST EFFECTIVE IN A POST‐FUKUSHIMA WORLD?

In the aftermath of Fukushima, decisions to slow or stop the future use of nuclear power have not been based on rational economic analysis. We find that there are cost‐effective technologies that would greatly mitigate future natural disasters. Even if the U.S. nuclear industry adopted new safety technologies and paid the full cost of insurance and borrowing, it is more efficient to continue to use existing nuclear plants than to replace them with new fossil fuel plants. However, new nuclear plant costs can exceed fossil fuel alternatives if the price of carbon emissions is below $118/ton. (JEL Q40, Q48, Q54)     

Attendance and work effort in the Great Northern Coalfield, 1775–18641

The transition to industrial capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was accompanied by a decline in irregular work attendance. The chronology of that decline is unclear due to a lack of quantitative evidence. This article examines detailed colliery records from a crucial period of industrial transition and shows that traditional patterns of attendance and work effort survived in one of the leading sectors of the industrial revolution well into the second half of the nineteenth century. The study shows how regional and local sources can throw new light upon problems for which national quantitative data are unavailable.     

Contracting in Peer Networks

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.     

Monetary Policy,Neutrality, and the Environment

We study the interaction between monetary/fiscal policies in a Ramsey–Sidrauski model augmented with the “Green Golden Rule.” We demonstrate conditions whereby monetary and fiscal policy under different utility and preference assumptions are or are not environmentally neutral. Despite its nonseparability in utility, we demonstrate that money is environmentally neutral. Policy impacts the environment via the marginal rate of transformation rather than the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and environment. Fiscal policies under a balanced budget are environmentally nonneutral. Only under a nonbalanced budget, when deficits are monetized, is money environmentally nonneutral. Under cash-in-advance and transactions costs, money is environmentally nonneutral.     

Private Equity and Local Public Finances

We study the economic impact of private equity (PE) investments on local governments, which are important corporate stakeholders. Examining over 11,000 deals and private firm data in Europe, we document that target firms' effective tax rates and total tax expenses decrease by 15% and 13% after PE deals. At the same time, target firms expand their capital expenditures and firm boundaries, but do not increase employment. Using administrative data on the public finances of German municipalities and exploiting the geographical and time-series variation in PE deals, we document that PE activity is negatively associated with local governments' tax revenues and spending. This result is likely driven by reduced tax payments of PE portfolio firms, accompanied by only modest positive spillovers of PE investments on regional economic growth. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax efficiency serves as a cost-cutting channel in the PE sector and constrains the finances of local governments.