Strategic Consumption Complementarities: Can Price Flexibility Eliminate Inefficiencies and Instability?

Generally, two facts occur with strategic complementarities and fixed prices: (i) the equilibria are multiple and (ii) if the complementarities are strong, the law of demand is violated and the equilibrium is unstable. In this paper, we analyse the effect of price flexibility on these features as well as on market welfare properties. Assuming an exchange economy with H agents consuming two goods with one strategic complement, we show that flexibility of prices may remove both the multiplicity of the equilibria and the instability of behavior when the externalities are strong. Moreover, we find conditions to correct instability when it is caused by perverse wealth effects. When preferences are quasilinear and identical, if the externality is beneficial, any equilibrium is Pareto optimal despite the externality. But if the externality is detrimental, corrections are required.     

Private Sector Wealth: Quarterly Estimates for use in an Aggregate Model*

The paper presents some estimates of private-sector wealth in Australia for the 1958-75 period. Basically, we have attempted to consolidate the balance sheets of all sectors, except the government and the foreign sector. Different procedures have been used for the various components of private-sector wealth and estimates are presented for real assets of the household sector (dwellings, motor vehicles and consumer durables), for fixed assets and inventories of the business sector, and for government liabilities to the private sector. Broadly, the data indicate that over the 1958-75 period, private wealth grew faster than population but slower than output and business capital stock. Dwellings and motor vehicles were the fastest growing components of private wealth. Reflecting the rise in the share of foreign claims on businesses in Australia, the Australian claims on business assets increased at a slower rate than the increase in the business-capital stock.     

Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations

A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players is called partnership formation‐proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution‐proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well‐known allocation rules.     

Combined Income Taxes and Tax-Benefit Systems

We extend the analysis of income tax progression to combined taxes, benefits, and the tax-benefit system. The overall redistributive impacts of constituent reforms are identified. Our findings point to the importance of interaction effects and demonstrate the dangers of isolated reforms.     

The Impacts of Enterprise Resource Planning Systems on Accounting Practice – The Australian Experience

This paper reports on the enteqbrise resource planning (ERP) systems experiences of Australian companies. It examines the degree of information system integration and associated benefits that respondent companies believe they have achieved, and the impact of ERP systems on the adoption of new accounting practices. The results indicate that while ERP users report high levels of information integration for many functional areas, the pattern is similar to that of non- users. Also, ERP systems seem to perform better in transaction processing and ad hoc decision- support than in sophisticated decision-support and reporting. Finally, ERP systems were found to have little influence on the use of new accounting practices.     

Financial disclosure effects on labor contracts: A Nash analysis

Abstract. This study investigated the role of financial information disclosure on union-management preferences for labor contract outcomes. The effect of accounting information on negotiated outcome proximity to Nash equilibrium outcomes was also examined. Both the extent and credibility of financial information disclosure as well as dyadic and team negotiations were examined. Conjoint analysis was used to measure union and management preferences for contract attributes. Results indicated insignificant conjoint part worth differences on union and management contractual preferences under both accounting information and team negotiation treatments. Actual contractual outcomes were significantly correlated with Nash predictions, and information disclosure had a marginally significant effect on the proximity of actual to predicted outcomes. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient le rôle de la présentation d'informations financières dans les préférences du syndicat et de la direction en ce qui a trait au contrat de travail final. Ils s'intéressent également à l'incidence de l'information comptable lorsque les conventions négociées se rapprochent de l'équilibre de Nash. L'étendue et la crédibilité de l'information financière présentée ainsi que les négociations dyadiques et collectives sont aussi objet d'étude. Les auteurs ont recours à l'analyse conjointe pour mesurer les préférences du syndicat et de la direction à l'égard des attributs du contrat de travail. Les résultats indiquent des écarts non significatifs dans la valeur conjointe partielle associée par le syndicat et la direction aux attributs du contrat, par suite du traitement de l'information comptable ainsi que de la négociation collective. Le contrat final qui résulte présente une corrélation significative avec les prévisions de Nash, et la communication d'informations a une incidence marginale sur l'analogie entre les résultats réels et les résultats prévus.