Communication in Multiperiod Agencies with Production and Financial Decisions*

Abstract. This paper examines a two-consumption date principal/agent model in which the manager receives private information at the first date. After observing his private information, the manager (agent) selects both the capital and personal effort he will invest in production. Operating cash flows are realized at both dates and any uninvested funds at the initial date are either paid out as a dividend to the equityholders (principal) or invested in zero net present value investments that require no effort. The aggregate cash flow at the second date is paid out as a dividend to the equityholders. The compensation contract specifies the manager's compensation as a function of the information available at the two dates. The key issue is whether it is valuable to have the contract based on the agent's communication of his private information. As in a single-consumption date model, communication may permit the implementation of more efficient incentives with respect to the manager's action choices. In addition, communication can facilitate the smoothing of the manager's consumption over the two dates. Direct communication can have positive value, but the analysis identifies a number of factors that can result in communication having no value. These factors include no direct preference for effort, public reporting of the private information at the second date, access to personal investments, and access to a dividend policy that will costlessly convey the private information through first-date dividends. Although access to personal investments may make communication redundant (since it is an alternative means of smoothing consumption), the analysis identifies conditions under which the equityholders would prefer to use communication and restrict the manager's access to personal investments (since it can have a negative effect on incentives). Résumé. Les auteurs examinent un modèle mandant-mandataire à deux dates de consommation dans lequel le gestionnaire reçoit de l'information privilégiée à la première des deux dates. Après avoir observé l'information privilégiée, le gestionnaire (c'est-à-dire le mandataire) sélectionne le capital et l'effort personnel qu'il investira dans la production. Les flux monétaires provenant de l'exploitation sont réalisés aux deux dates, et tous les fonds qui ne sont pas investis à la date initiale sont soit versés sous forme de dividendes aus. actionnaires (c'est-à-dire les mandants), soit investis dans des placements à valeur actualisée nette nulle et qui n'exigent aucun effort. Les flux monétaires totaux à la seconde date sont versés sous forme de dividendes aux actionnaires. Selon le contrat de rémunération, la rétribution des gestionnaires est fonction de l'information disponible aux deux dates. Le principal problème consiste à déterminer si le fait de baser le contrat sur la communication par le mandataire de l'information privilégiée dont il dispose présente un intérêt. Comme dans un modèle à une seule date de consommation, la communication peut permettre la mise en place de stimulants plus efficients en ce qui a trait au choix du gestionnaire concernant son plan d'action. En outre, la communication peut faciliter le nivellement de la consommation du gestionnaire entre les deux dates. La communication directe peut avoir une valeur positive, mais l'analyse permet de cerner plusieurs facteurs qui peuvent retirer toute valeur à une communication. Au nombre de ces facteurs figurent: l'absence de préférence directe pour l'effort, la communication publique de l'information privilégiée à la seconde date, l'accès aux placements personnels et l'accès à une politique de dividendes qui livrera sans frais l'information privilégiée par le truchement du versement de dividendes de la première date. Bien que l'accès aux placement personnels puisse rendre la communication redondante (puisqu'il s'agit d'un moyen de rechange de niveler la consommation), les auteurs définissent les conditions dans lesquelles les actionnaires préféreraient utiliser la communication et restreindre l'accès du gestionnaire aux placements personnels (puisqu'ils peuvent avoir un effet négatif sur les stimulants).     

IMPACT OF CHILD QUALITY ON EARNINGS: THE PRODUCTIVITY-OF-SCHOOLING HYPOTHESIS

This paper investigates the relationship between average earnings, education (measured by years of schooling), and rates of return to education for major racial/ethnic groups in the United States. It considers the effect of including previously omitted "productivity-of-schooling" (also referred to here as "child quality") variables. An upward-sloping average education, rate-of-return-to-education profile exists for His-panics, blacks, and whites. Productivity-of-schooling (i.e., child quality) measures– including family size, family composition, ability, and parental inputs–significantly affect earnings and rates of return to education. The results here are consistent with Chiswick (1988). Conditions within the family play a larger role in determining the value of education for minority males than for white males, a conclusion of obvious interest to policymakers.     

Interest Arbitrators and Their Decision Behavior

We analyze the salary portions of a multi-state sample of police interest arbitration awards to determine what decision criteria (e.g., pay comparability, ability to pay, inflation) arbitrators' mention most frequently. Using the results, we construct measures of these criteria and assess their influence on awarded salaries. We find that arbitrated salaries are related to several of the measures and also to the employer and union salary offers. The parties' offers are also influenced by our measures, indicating that unions and employers attempt to strategically position their offers before the arbitrator.     

The Economic Crisis in Professional Football

Football clubs have only themselves to blame for their current financial malaise, highlighted by the recent decision to turn down an exclusive offer for broadcasting right from BBC and ITV. They have refused to acknowledge changes in consumer demand; they have not advertised, nor shifted their grounds to more densely populated areas, and have made no efforts to attract more women to matches. They have cushioned themselves against change at the cost of increasing inefficiency.     

Voluntary Income-Increasing Accounting Changes*

Abstract. This article presents an explanation of the reasons that managers might elect to change accounting methods. Facing adversity with a nontrivial probability of technical default on the debt covenants, the manager is motivated to effect an income-increasing accounting change to circumvent a technical default. Under rational expectations, if investors do not have any prior information about the firm's adversity, the market reaction on an accounting change announcement is predicted to be negative. We postulate that the market impact on the date of change announcement is negatively correlated with the amount of information the investors may have. A sample of 77 firms was selected to test the economic arguments. Investors' reaction to the accounting change was tested by abnormal returns on dates of announcement. Cross-sectional tests associate the investors' reaction with their prior information about the financial status of the sample firms. On the date of the change announcement, the sample firms did not experience a statistically significant negative market reaction. However, in a cross-sectional analysis, the market impact parameter was found to be significantly correlated in a negative manner with the prior information proxy variable.     

A Field Study of the Review Process: Research Note

Despite the stated importance of the audit review process in auditing standards and textbooks, research on the process itself is limited. This study provides evidence on the nature and purpose of the review process by examining the actual review notes prepared by managers of a Big-6 accounting firm. A sample of twenty-eight audit engagements resulting in 3,008 separate review notes was examined. The results suggest that quality control aspects appear to be the main focus of the review process. Review notes sometimes indicated the need to gather further information and/or undertake additional testing, and provided direct as well as indirect advice on the audit approach to subordinates. Few surprises resulted from the review process, and the review notes and approaches varied among managers.